§ 142.5     On Postpetition Claims
Cite as:    Keith M. Lundin, Lundin On Chapter 13, § 142.5, at ¶ ____, LundinOnChapter13.com (last visited __________).

Section 348(d) states that upon conversion, a claim against the estate or against the debtor that arose after the order for relief in the Chapter 13 case, other than a claim for administrative expenses under § 503(b), “shall be treated for all purposes as if such claim had arisen immediately before the date of the filing of the petition.”1 The language of § 348(d) captures more than just postpetition claims allowable under § 13052—all debts that arise after the petition that are not administrative expenses, whether allowable under § 1305 or not, will be “thrown back” by § 348(d) to become prepetition claims after conversion. For example, postpetition claims for which no proof of claim has been filed or consumer debts that were incurred after the petition without the trustee’s prior approval would be treated by § 348(d) as prepetition claims in the Chapter 7 case.3 To avoid getting lumped with the rest of the general creditors after conversion to Chapter 7, a postpetition claim holder must prove entitlement to administrative expense status under § 503(b).


Bankruptcy Rule 1019(6) describes the procedure and timing for filing postpetition claims and requests for administrative expenses after conversion of a Chapter 13 case to Chapter 7.4 With respect to ordinary debts that arose after the Chapter 13 petition and before conversion, Rule 1019(6) provides that a proof of claim may be filed in the Chapter 7 case in accordance with Bankruptcy Rules 3001(a) through (d) and 3002.5 As discussed in detail elsewhere,6 Bankruptcy Rule 3002 typically requires a nongovernmental unit to file a proof of claim within 90 days of the first date set for the meeting of creditors.7 A governmental unit can file a timely proof of claim within 180 days after the order for relief, which would be 180 days from the notice of voluntary conversion under § 1307(a) or 180 days from the order of conversion after a motion under § 1307(c). If the case is a no-asset Chapter 7 case after conversion, chances are all creditors, including postpetition claim holders, will be instructed not to file proofs of claim in the notice of the new meeting of creditors.


If the debt incurred during the Chapter 13 is entitled to administrative expense status under § 503(b), then a request for payment must be “timely” filed, or the request may be tardily filed if permitted by the bankruptcy court for cause.8 Under Bankruptcy Rule 1019(6), a request for payment by a nongovernmental creditor of an administrative expense incurred before conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 is timely filed “before conversion or at a time fixed by the court.”9 If the administrative expense is held by a governmental unit, the request for payment is timely filed “before conversion or within the later of a time fixed by the court or 180 days after the date of the conversion.”10 This 180-day reference acknowledges the 1994 amendment to § 502(b)(9) of the Code.11


Bankruptcy Rule 1019(6) as amended in 1999 could present some procedural problems for the holders of unpaid administrative expenses at conversion to Chapter 7. Conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 typically is not a leisurely, planned event. Especially when the motion is filed by the trustee or a creditor, conversion can occur suddenly and against the debtor’s wishes.


The most common unpaid administrative expenses at conversion from Chapter 13 are fees for debtor’s counsel and taxes. Under Bankruptcy Rule 1019(6), unless a local rule or court order fixes a different time, debtor’s counsel must file an administrative expense request for unpaid fees “before conversion.” Section 503(b) permits a tardy request for “cause.” Under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1), the time for filing a request for payment of an administrative expense can be extended by motion after conversion upon a showing of “excusable neglect.”12 In one of the few reported decisions on the subject, a bankruptcy court found discretion in Bankruptcy Rule 1019(6) to fix a time after conversion for the filing of requests for administrative expenses when the debtor’s attorney was misled about the deadline by changes in local procedures.13 Either route—a tardily filed request or a motion to enlarge time—may require notice and a hearing. Obviously, debtor’s counsel is better off to request unpaid fees before conversion to avoid the cost and delay of the alternatives.


A governmental unit with an unpaid administrative expense has at least 180 days after conversion in which to timely request payment under Bankruptcy Rule 1019(6). This generosity by the rules drafters is conspicuously in contrast to the stingy rule with respect to administrative expenses owed to nongovernmental creditors at conversion.


Bankruptcy Rule 1019(6) partially answers the question whether a governmental unit can timely file a request for administrative expenses after the 180-day deadline for filing timely claims in § 502(b)(9) of the Code.14 At conversion Bankruptcy Rule 1019(6) redefines “timely” for administrative expenses held by governmental entities to include a request filed “before conversion.” An administrative expense request filed by a governmental entity after 180 days after the petition that might otherwise be untimely becomes a timely request when the Chapter 13 case converts to Chapter 7. This relieves the governmental entity of proving cause for a tardy request under § 503(b) and from proving “excusable neglect” for an extension of time under Bankruptcy Rule 9006.


The same retroactive validation seems to apply to administrative expense requests by nongovernmental entities at conversion—any such request filed before conversion becomes timely under Bankruptcy Rule 1019(6) notwithstanding that no other bankruptcy rule defines “timely” for purposes of a preconversion request for administrative expenses by nongovernmental entities.15


Bankruptcy Rule 1019(5)(B)(i) requires the debtor, not later than 15 days after conversion, to file a schedule of unpaid debts incurred during the Chapter 13 case.16 This new schedule must include the address of each holder of a debt incurred during the superseded Chapter 13 case. Bankruptcy Rule 1019(6) then directs:

[U]pon the filing of the schedule of unpaid debts incurred after commencement of the case and before conversion, the clerk or some other person as the court may direct, shall give notice to those entities listed on the schedule of the time for filing a request for payment of an administrative expense and . . . the time for filing a claim of a kind specified in § 348(d).17

The schedule of unpaid postpetition debts is an important filing that can get the debtor in all kinds of trouble if not prepared carefully. The names and addresses of these new creditors typically will not be on any other matrix or list in the bankruptcy case. Notice to these creditors of deadlines and bar dates in the Chapter 7 case depends on the accuracy and timeliness of this new schedule.


Perhaps to overemphasize this point, one bankruptcy court held that failure to file a schedule of unpaid postpetition debt bars discharge of a debt incurred before conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. In In re Nephew,18 the Chapter 13 plan was confirmed in May 1999. In June and August of 1999, the debtors’ daughter received emergency dental treatment. The Chapter 13 case converted to Chapter 7 in December 1999. The dentist was unpaid, but the debtors failed to file a schedule of unpaid postpetition debt. Two and a half years after conversion, the dentist took a judgment against the debtors and began a wage execution. The debtors reopened the Chapter 7 case and claimed a violation of the discharge injunction. The bankruptcy court held that the debtors’ “intentional or reckless failure” to file the schedule of postpetition debt barred discharge of the debt:

In view of the provisions of Section 348(d) and Section 727(b) a post-petition, non-administrative expense claim indebtedness incurred by a debtor in a Chapter 13 case would be discharged . . . when the Chapter 13 case is converted to a Chapter 7 case under Section 1307, even if the indebtedness is not scheduled as required by Rule 1019(5), provided the converted Chapter 7 case is a no asset case, unless: (1) there has been an intentional or reckless failure to schedule the creditor holding the post-petition indebtedness, a fraudulent scheme, intentional laches or prejudice to the creditor; and (2) the indebtedness might otherwise be nondischargeable under Sections 523(a)(2), (4), (6) or (15). . . . In this case, given the requirements of Rule 1019(5) . . . I find that the failures of the Debtors to: (1) respond to the unpaid statements and demands during their Chapter 7 case by specifically advising [the dentist] and its attorneys of their pending Chapter 7 bankruptcy case and their position that the indebtedness . . . would be discharged in their converted Chapter 7 case; or (2) to meet their obligations under Rule 1019(5), constitutes a sufficiently reckless failure to schedule . . . . [I]n a case converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, where there should be few, if any, unpaid post-petition Chapter 13 pre-conversion debts, the debtor bears an extremely heavy burden to demonstrate why the scheduling requirements of Rule 1019(5) have not been complied with.19

Barring the discharge of postpetition debt when the debtor fails to file the schedule required by Bankruptcy Rule 1019(5) is a nonstatutory exception to discharge that is inconsistent with § 523(a)(3) and unnecessarily punitive. Absent a fraud exception under § 523(a)(2), (4) or (6), such debt should be dischargeable even if not scheduled at all.20 On the other hand, Nephew certainly signals that the schedule of postpetition debt required by Rule 1019(5) is an important filing that must be generated in every Chapter 13 case that converts to Chapter 7 and failure to do so is not free.


Administrative expense status under § 503(b) can be helpful to the holder of a claim that arose during the Chapter 13 case and before conversion to Chapter 7. Under § 1326(a)(2), if no plan was confirmed, the holder of “any unpaid claim allowed under section 503(b)” is entitled to be paid from the money held by the Chapter 13 trustee before the balance is refunded to the debtor.21 It is probable in this context that “claim” in § 1326(a)(2) was intended to include administrative “expenses” allowed under § 503(b).22 At conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, the exception in § 348(d) for a claim “specified in § 503(b)” means that administrative expenses arising during the Chapter 13 case are not treated for all purposes the same as prepetition claims in the Chapter 7 case. Instead, administrative expenses are entitled to a second priority of distribution, just behind the expenses of administration of the Chapter 7 case, under 11 U.S.C. § 726(b). As is always true in Chapter 7, administrative expense status is worth something only if there are assets in the estate. The money held by the Chapter 13 trustee at conversion to Chapter 7 is sometimes the only cash that will be available to pay administrative expenses in the Chapter 7 case.23


There are many debts that arise during a Chapter 13 case and before conversion that could be administrative expenses under § 503(b). For example, taxes incurred by the estate may satisfy the administrative expense definition in § 503(b)(1)(B).24 Debtor’s attorney fees may be administrative expenses excepted from the throwback of § 348(d); and unpaid fees would be subject to review for reasonableness and benefit under § 330(a)(4)(B) after conversion to Chapter 7.25 Postpetition utility services26 and postpetition lease or rental payments27 may be administrative expenses under § 503(b).


Administrative expense status under § 503(b) does not help the postpetition creditor with respect to discharge after conversion to Chapter 7. Under § 348(b), for purposes of discharge under § 727(b), the “order for relief” in the Chapter 7 case is defined as “the conversion.” In other words, postpetition, preconversion debts, including administrative expenses from the Chapter 13 case, are dischargeable after conversion to Chapter 7, unless an exception to discharge under § 523(a) applies. Thus, all postpetition debts from the Chapter 13 case are subject to the usual discharge rules after conversion to Chapter 7, without regard to administrative expense status during the Chapter 13 case.


For example, as discussed above,28 taxes incurred by the Chapter 13 estate, if characterized as administrative expenses under § 503(b)(1)(B), would not be treated for all purposes as prepetition claims at conversion to Chapter 7 because of the exception in § 348(d). Such taxes would have a second priority for distribution in the Chapter 7 case under § 726(b). But for discharge purposes, the taxes would be nondischargeable to the extent provided in § 523(a)(1). In contrast, attorney’s fees awarded during the Chapter 13 case prior to conversion would share the second priority of distribution in the Chapter 7 case; but because no exception to discharge applies under § 523(a), the preconversion attorney’s fees would be discharged by §§ 727(b) and 348(b).29


A tax claim arising during the Chapter 13 case that is not an expense of administration under § 503(b)(1)(B) would be treated by § 348(d) as a prepetition claim at conversion to Chapter 7. For example, in In re Rainey,30 the Chapter 13 case filed in 1995 was converted to Chapter 7 in 1998. During the three years in Chapter 13, the debtor’s corporation failed to pay sales and use taxes. Under state law, the debtor was personally liable. The bankruptcy court rejected the taxing authority’s argument that the debtor’s responsible person liability was an administrative expense after conversion from Chapter 7:

[Section] 503(b)(1)(B) . . . sets forth a second requirement for taxes to be administrative expenses—that not only must the tax be incurred postpetition, but it must also be incurred “by the estate” itself, and not a corporation owned by a debtor . . . . [A]t the time the sales and use taxes were incurred the corporation was a separate legal entity and as such would not have ever been and is not now part of the bankruptcy estate. Any sales or use tax incurred in the operation of the corporation does not become tax incurred in the administration of the Debtor’s individual bankruptcy estate by virtue of the Debtor’s personal liability for that tax.31

The question in Rainey then became, to what status was the responsible person liability entitled if not an administrative expense? The bankruptcy court looked to § 348(d) and found that the tax had eighth priority in the Chapter 7 case:

[T]he tax at issue was incurred by the corporation during the pendency of the Chapter 13 case and therefore, arose after the order for relief but before conversion of the case. Accordingly, in light of the conversion of the Debtor’s case to Chapter 7, the Commissioner’s claim for sales and use tax incurred during the pendency of the Debtor’s Chapter 13 case is to be treated as a prepetition tax claim which by the language of Bankruptcy Code § 507(a)(8)(C) is entitled only to the eighth priority granted to it by that section.32

There is a bit of disagreement in the reported cases with respect to the treatment of unpaid rent at conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. In Stoltz v. Brattleboro Housing Authority,33 the district court held that unpaid rent incurred during a Chapter 13 case became prepetition debt in the Chapter 7 case and was dischargeable. In contrast, in In re Babbs,34 the bankruptcy court held that residential rent accruing during a Chapter 13 case before conversion was an administrative expense that could not be discharged in the Chapter 7 case. The bankruptcy court in Babbs gave this explanation:

[Section] 348(d) treats post-petition debts as arising pre-petition when a Chapter 13 is converted to a Chapter 7. Rather than being rewarded or encouraged to continue relations with the debtor, the residential lessor could face discharge, leaving him without compensation for several months of rental arrears. This Court finds that the residential or nonresidential status of the premises is irrelevant to satisfying the two preconditions of allowable administrative expenses. Both types of leases provide similar benefits to the estate and pertain to the same post-petition time period. In addition, as the risks facing either type of lessor are similar and the credit extended covers a similar length of time, the policy reasons for granting administrative expense priority to post-petition creditors apply equally to residential lessors and nonresidential lessors. In summation, this Court holds that residential rental arrears merit administrative expense priority and cannot be discharged when a case is converted from a Chapter 13 to a Chapter 7.35

Half of the reasoning in Babbs seems sound—unpaid residential rent accruing during the Chapter 13 case, if reasonable and necessary for preservation of the Chapter 13 estate,36 could be entitled to administrative expense priority. But the citation in Babbs to § 348(d) does not answer the question whether unpaid rent is dischargeable at conversion. This question is answered by § 348(b), and the answer should be that unpaid rent is dischargeable in the Chapter 7 case even if it is also entitled to administrative expense priority for purposes of distribution.


Several courts have concluded that utility debts incurred during the Chapter 13 case are not entitled to administrative expense priority, are treated as prepetition claims after conversion and are dischargeable in the Chapter 7 case.37 Some of these cases argue from the effect of § 1327(b):38 when property of the estate vests in the debtor at confirmation, there is no longer a Chapter 13 estate to preserve; utility debts accumulating after confirmation cannot be actual or necessary expenses of preservation of the estate for § 503(b) purposes.39


The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit offers a contrary view in the context of postpetition debts incurred by a Chapter 13 debtor engaged in business. In Security Bank of Marshalltown v. Neiman,40 the Chapter 13 debtor was a hog farmer who incurred debts for feed and veterinary services before conversion to Chapter 7. In a battle over funds recovered by the Chapter 7 trustee, the Eighth Circuit held that the unpaid expenses of maintaining the debtor’s hogs were administrative expenses necessary to preserve the Chapter 13 estate pursuant to § 503(b)(1)(A) and thus were entitled to (second) priority of distribution in the Chapter 7 case. To reach this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit held that § 1327(b) did not dissolve the Chapter 13 estate at confirmation of a plan; rather, “the Chapter 13 estate continued post-confirmation” and the postpetition debts to preserve the hog herd were administrative expenses of that estate.


Conversion to Chapter 7 is one of the strategies available to the Chapter 13 debtor when a postpetition claim holder has failed or refused to file proof of its postpetition claim.41 Conversion to Chapter 7 captures the postpetition claim even if not allowable and renders it dischargeable in the Chapter 7 case. The threat of conversion to Chapter 7 may prompt the postpetition claim holder to file a claim or to negotiate for payment through the Chapter 13 plan.


1  11 U.S.C. § 348(d). See § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA and § 137.2  Postpetition Claims after BAPCPA.


2  See § 113.6  Providing for Postpetition Claims, § 132.9  Postpetition Claims, § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA and § 137.2  Postpetition Claims after BAPCPA.


3  See United Counties Trust Co. v. Knapp (In re Knapp), 137 B.R. 582 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) (Debts incurred during the “gap period” between the filing of Chapter 13 petition and conversion to Chapter 7 are dischargeable prepetition claims in the Chapter 7 case unless excepted from discharge under § 523.).


4  See § 279.1 [ Priority Claims, Including Requests for Payment of Administrative Expenses ] § 132.6  Priority Claims, Including Requests for Payment of Administrative Expenses for discussion of the timely filing of requests for administrative expenses at conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7.


5  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1019(6).


6  See § 275.2 [ In General: Filing is Required for Allowance ] § 132.2  In General: Filing is Required for Allowance.


7  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c).


8  11 U.S.C. § 503(a). See § 132.2  In General: Filing is Required for Allowance, § 132.9  Postpetition Claims§ 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA and § 137.2  Postpetition Claims after BAPCPA.


9  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1019(6).


10  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1019(6).


11  11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) provides that the claim of a governmental unit is timely filed “before 180 days after the date of the order for relief or such later time as the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure may provide.”


12  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1).


13  In re Simmons, 286 B.R. 426, 428–30 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2002) (“Under [Bankruptcy Rule 1019(6)], a request for payment of a pre-conversion administrative expense is timely only if it is filed before conversion, unless the court fixes another time. . . . Rule 1019(6) grants the court discretion to change the rule by fixing a time by which the application will be considered timely. The court feels it only fair to do so under these circumstances.”).


14  This question is discussed further in §§ 276.1 [ Governmental Units ] § 132.3  Governmental Units and 279.1 [ Priority Claims, Including Requests for Payment of Administrative Expenses ] § 132.6  Priority Claims, Including Requests for Payment of Administrative Expenses.


15  See § 279.1 [ Priority Claims, Including Requests for Payment of Administrative Expenses ] § 132.6  Priority Claims, Including Requests for Payment of Administrative Expenses for further discussion of the timely filing of priority claims and requests for administrative expenses.


16  See § 142.1  New Schedules, Statement, Meeting of Creditors and Deadlines and § 142.2  Deadlines and Filing Requirements at Conversion after BAPCPA.


17  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1019(6).


18  290 B.R. 202 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003).


19  290 B.R. at 206–09.


20  See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3).


21  See § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA, § 137.2  Postpetition Claims after BAPCPA, § 143.1  In Cases Filed before October 22, 1994§ 143.2  In Cases Filed after October 22, 1994, § 143.3  Payments Held by Chapter 13 Trustee at Conversion: § 1326(a)(2) after BAPCPA and § 153.1  In General. See also § 54.9  Compensation When Case Is Dismissed or Converted before Confirmation and § 162.5  On Administrative Expenses.


22  See also § 73.2  What Claims Are Priority Claims?§ 73.3  Priority Claims Added or Changed by BAPCPA and § 136.1  Treatment of Priority Claims.


23  See discussion beginning at § 143.1  In Cases Filed before October 22, 1994.


24  See § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA§ 136.3  Taxes after BAPCPA, § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA and § 137.2  Postpetition Claims after BAPCPA.


25  See § 73.8  Special Provisions for Attorneys’ Fees§ 73.9  Attorney Fees after BAPCPA, § 136.6  Debtors’ Attorneys’ Fees before BAPCPA and § 136.7  Debtors’ Attorneys’ Fees after BAPCPA. See, e.g., In re Polishuk, 258 B.R. 238, 249–50 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2001) (In a Chapter 7 case that was filed under Chapter 11, converted to Chapter 13 and then converted to Chapter 7, debtor’s attorneys can recover fees for services during the Chapter 13 case that either benefited the debtor or benefitted the estate, but fees for plan preparation, claims litigation and efforts to keep the debtor’s car are not allowed because counsel should have known that there was no reasonable prospect of confirming a Chapter 13 plan. Under § 330(a)(4)(B), a debtor’s attorney can recover for services rendered during a Chapter 13 case that do not benefit the bankruptcy estate so long as they do benefit the debtor. “[T]he Court is unable to find that [debtor’s attorneys] could have reasonably believed that Mr. Polishuk had a realistic hope of reorganization under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code. . . . Given these facts, it is difficult for the Court to see how the time spent by [debtor’s attorneys] in general administrative matters or in preparation of a plan was of any true benefit either to Mr. Polishuk or his bankruptcy estate. . . . [T]he same is true with respect to the 19.65 hours spent by [debtor’s attorneys] litigating and/or negotiating with TMCC so that Mr. Polishuk could retain his vehicle. . . . While he may have needed a vehicle to get to and from work and to perform other personal and business activities, there is no showing that he needed this particular vehicle. The amount of the monthly lease payments ($379.86) were sufficient to provide for acquisition of a different vehicle. The Court concludes that these efforts were not reasonable or beneficial, and should not be compensated with proceeds of the bankruptcy estate. . . . Absent the likelihood of a confirmable plan, any efforts regarding claims classification were of no consequence. Thus, the fees incurred in this area should not be compensated from the estate.”); In re Pontarelli, 250 B.R. 160, 161 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2000) (On remand, after conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, former counsel is allowed $3,000 for fees out of an application for $11,100. Counsel spent a lot of time “protecting the debtor’s residence . . . . [I]t was always the Debtor who was the potential recipient of the benefit of such services.” No plan was confirmed. When asked what benefit his services conferred upon the estate, former counsel answered, “[W]hen it became apparent that a Chapter 13 plan was not confirmable . . . [counsel] was successful in delaying the proceedings until the debtor’s house was destroyed by a fire (of suspicious origin).”).


26  See § 136.8  Utilities before BAPCPA and § 136.9  Utilities after BAPCPA.


27  See § 136.10  Leases and Executory Contracts before BAPCPA and § 136.11  Leases and Executory Contracts after BAPCPA.


28  See § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA§ 136.3  Taxes after BAPCPA, § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA and § 137.2  Postpetition Claims after BAPCPA.


29  See In re Toms, 229 B.R. 646, 653–54 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999) (Fees allowed to debtor’s attorneys for work during Chapter 13 case are entitled to second priority of distribution after conversion to Chapter 7 but are dischargeable debts in the Chapter 7 case. “In the context of this dispute, were [the debtor’s attorneys] to receive an allowance under section 330(a), this award would be an administrative claim in the debtor’s chapter 13 case. By virtue of section 348(d), the law firm would still hold an administrative claim upon conversion of the case to chapter 7, entitled to a priority of payment from the trustee under sections 507(a)(1) and 726(a)(1), because it does not become a prepetition claim. Despite its priority position, however, it is subject to discharge under section 727(b), because it is a claim which arose before the conversion of the case to Chapter 7 as defined by section 348(b).”). Accord Fickling v. Flower, Medalie & Markowitz (In re Fickling), 361 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2004) (At conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, unpaid preconversion administrative expenses for debtor’s attorney fees are a dischargeable debt in the Chapter 7 case). But see Hines v. Gordon (In re Hines), 198 B.R. 769, 771–73 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (“A debt arising during the pendency of a case gives rise to a dischargeable debt upon conversion of the case to another chapter unless the debt is deemed nondischargeable under § 523 of the Code. . . . [T]he debt to [the debtor’s attorney] was dischargeable . . . . Sending a past due notice . . . and ordering [the debtor] by telephone to pay the attorney fees are . . . coercion or harassment and are not excepted from the stay.”), rev’d, 147 F.3d 1185, 1190–92 (9th Cir. 1998) (After conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, former counsel cashed post-dated checks to recover fees for postpetition services supplied pursuant to a prepetition fee agreement; claims for the fees did not fall within the automatic stay and were not discharged. Finding that Congress had failed to provide a solution to the problem of collection and discharge of attorneys’ fees for postpetition services rendered pursuant to a prepetition fee agreement, “we are compelled to consider an appropriate judicial response—one that recognizes that the very administration of the bankruptcy system requires that attorneys for Chapter 7 debtors must have a legally enforceable right for their postpetition services that were contracted for before filing of the petition. If the absence of such a right were to become the law, it does not require much thought to recognize that the entire system would suffer a massive breakdown. In our view the required recognition of such a right, essentially a doctrine of necessity, is best implemented by a holding that all claims for lawyers’ compensation stemming from such postpetition services actually provided to the debtor really do not fall within the automatic stay provisions of Section 362(a)(6) or the discharge provisions of Section 727. . . . In light of the unsettled state of the law in this area when [the debtor’s former counsel] acted, . . . we uphold the bankruptcy court’s determination rather than that of the BAP as to the nonviolation of the automatic stay.”).


30  257 B.R. 792 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2001).


31  257 B.R. at 795.


32  257 B.R. at 795.


33  259 B.R. 255 (D. Vt. 2001).


34  265 B.R. 35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001).


35  265 B.R. at 38–39.


36  See 11 U.S.C. §  503(b)(1)(A). See also§ 136.10  Leases and Executory Contracts before BAPCPA and § 136.11  Leases and Executory Contracts after BAPCPA.


37  See, e.g., Martinez v. Public Serv. Co. (In re Martinez), 92 B.R. 916 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (Postpetition, preconversion utility service claims are prepetition claims under § 348(d) and not administrative expenses under § 503(b). Upon confirmation, the bankruptcy estate ceased to contain property not designated in the plan, and debts incurred for utilities after confirmation could not be expenses for preservation of the estate.); In re Watts, 85 B.R. 470 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (Upon conversion to Chapter 7, utility is not entitled to administrative expense claim for bills unpaid during the Chapter 13 case.); In re Criss, 85 B.R. 459 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (Upon conversion to Chapter 7, claim for utility services provided to Chapter 13 debtor is a general unsecured claim in the Chapter 7 case.); In re Deiter, 33 B.R. 547 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983) (Claim for utilities arising between confirmation and conversion is dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b) and 348.).


38  See § 230.1 [ 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b): Vesting Effect on Property of Estate ] § 120.3  11 U.S.C. § 1327(b): Vesting Effect on Property of Estate.


39  See Martinez v. Public Serv. Co. (In re Martinez), 92 B.R. 916 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988). See § 136.8  Utilities before BAPCPA and § 136.9  Utilities after BAPCPA.


40  1 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1993).


41  See § 132.9  Postpetition Claims, § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA§ 137.2  Postpetition Claims after BAPCPA and  § 158.6  Postpetition Claims.