§ 112.4     Cause for Extension beyond Three Years
Cite as:    Keith M. Lundin, Lundin On Chapter 13, § 112.4, at ¶ ____, LundinOnChapter13.com (last visited __________).

For cause, the court can approve a plan that provides for payments over a period longer than three years, but the court may not approve a plan longer than five years.1 The debtor has the burden to demonstrate cause for extension beyond three years.2


In some jurisdictions, extension beyond three years is routinely allowed without a separate hearing, absent an objection to confirmation by the trustee or a creditor. In other jurisdictions, no plan is confirmed that extends beyond three years, absent a motion for extension and an evidentiary hearing.3


One appellate court has held that bankruptcy courts must make specific findings of cause before approving a Chapter 13 plan that extends beyond 36 months: a recitation in the confirmation order that “for good cause shown” the plan was extended to 42 months was not sufficient.4 This court disapproved the “routine” practice of confirming plans extending beyond 36 months without findings of cause specific to each case. Findings of facts in support of cause would require a hearing or some other form of evidence taking. It is not clear what purpose is served for bankruptcy courts to hold hearings and make formal findings of cause when there is no objection to confirmation of a debtor’s voluntary extension of payments beyond 36 months.


Typically, the debtor’s proposal to extend the plan beyond three years will benefit all creditors by paying more money than would be distributed in a 36-month plan. However, there is potential for abuse of extension beyond three years. Sometimes debtors are leveraged into four- and five-year plans by the threats of creditors. Litigation of an objection to confirmation is expensive. It is not unusual for debtors to extend payments beyond 36 months to cut off an objection to confirmation from a creditor that will receive a greater dividend during the period of extension.


The reported decisions addressing cause for extension beyond three years are contradictory and offer few guidelines. At one extreme, it has been said that “any reasonable justification” suffices as cause for extension under § 1322(d).5 There are cases holding that the debtor’s desire to pay a greater percentage of unsecured claims is not by itself sufficient cause for extension beyond three years.6 Several of these courts have cited the disposable income test in § 1325(b)7 for the proposition that a debtor who is proposing to pay all disposable income for three years cannot demonstrate cause to extend beyond three years if only to benefit unsecured claim holders. Some argue that if paying more to unsecured claim holders is cause, then the trustee or an unsecured claim holder will object to every composition plan that extends less than the maximum duration of five years. Ironically, one court cited the disposable income test in § 1325(b) as cause for extension of the plan beyond 36 months when the debtor proposed to keep a car that was not reasonable or necessary and the only way for the debtor to then satisfy the mathematics in § 1325(b)(1)(B) was to extend the plan beyond 36 months.8 Other courts just conclude that it is not sensible to stand in the way of a debtor who wants more time to pay a greater percentage of unsecured debt.9


When the proposed plan extension will not effect a substantial increase in dividends to unsecured claim holders, the courts have been quicker to refuse extension beyond three years.10 A few courts have allowed extension when the purpose is to pay a greater dividend to unsecured claim holders but only when the extension will provide unsecured claim holders at least 70 percent.11 This 70 percent rule comes from 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9), which bars discharge in a Chapter 7 case if the debtor received a Chapter 13 discharge within six years in a case that paid less than 70 percent of allowed unsecured claims. When extension beyond three years will pay 100 percent of unsecured claims, several courts have found cause for the extension.12


Although it has been said “inability to pay secured debt in 36 months may constitute cause for extending a plan,”13 the reported cases are hardly unanimous in this view. In In re Samadi,14 extension beyond 36 months to pay debts secured by cars and other personal property was refused notwithstanding that a 60 percent dividend for unsecured claims would result. The bankruptcy court was convinced that the extension was really intended to enable the debtors “to maintain a very comfortable lifestyle while discharging substantial unsecured debt.”15 In Hart v. Bowers,16 the debtor needed five years to pay a claim secured by a car. The resulting plan would pay 3.2 percent to unsecured creditors in the last two months. The district court gave the following especially negative account of plans that extend payments beyond 36 months:

[T]he congressional intent of § 1322(d) was to avoid imposition on debtors of long term repayment plans and prevent “involuntary servitude.” . . . Low percentage plans are not favored because if all of a debtor’s disposable income is devoted to the payment of secured debt, “chapter 13 becomes a little more than court-supervised system of reaffirmation of secured debt, with little attendant benefit to the intended beneficiaries of the chapter, unsecured creditors.” . . . Debtor is proposing to use virtually all of her disposable income for five (5) years to pay off her car loan with a de minimus distribution (3.2% dividend) to unsecured creditors and where Debtor has no priority claims nor is the extended term necessary to save her home, Debtor has not established “cause” under § 1322(d). . . . Judge Perkins rejected Debtor’s analogy to “save the home” cases finding that the Bankruptcy Code contains special provisions that are intended to facilitate the ability of Chapter 13 debtors to save their homes and . . . there are not comparable provisions designed to facilitate the debtor’s retention of an automobile.17

Counsel should look for some special circumstance in support of extension. Cause has been found when the debtor cannot pay priority claims, secured claims or the delinquency on a home mortgage within the first 36-month period.18 A 58-month plan was confirmed that allowed the debtor to keep a home notwithstanding that unsecured claim holders would receive no dividend during the period of extension.19 Cause has been found to extend beyond three years to retire a claim that would be nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 case.20 Medical expenses for surgery for the debtor’s wife constituted cause to extend a plan to four years.21 Substantial mortgage arrearages that could not be retired within three years constituted cause for at least a modest extension.22 It was held that a five-year plan is acceptable when the debtor sincerely desires to pay 100 percent of unsecured claims and is simply financially unable to pay debts in full in any shorter period.23 One court found that an “extremely hardworking and deserving debtor” should be allowed the opportunity to pay creditors through an extended plan.24 Notwithstanding a strong desire to pay creditors, confirmation of a 49-month plan was denied when the court found it would be against the best interests of the debtor to permit the extension.25


Extension will be refused when an objecting creditor demonstrates adverse effects of a longer plan. For example, when a secured claim holder would become undersecured or unsecured during the life of the plan due to depreciation of collateral, extension beyond 36 months is inappropriate.26 When a five-year plan would substantially modify a mortgage holder’s security interest, confirmation was denied.27 An extension to 60 months was denied, despite the debtor’s proposal to pay a 100 percent dividend to unsecured claim holders, when the purpose of the extension was to delay payment of disputed claims arising out of a divorce decree.28


It has been said that a debtor’s desire—no matter how sincere—to realize enhanced rehabilitative effect is not alone sufficient to justify extension.29 Confirmation of a five-year plan was denied when the extension beyond three years was proposed solely to overcome the denial of confirmation of a shorter plan.30


Especially after the 1990 bankruptcy amendments, debtors seek extensions beyond 36 months to manage claims that are nondischargeable.31 Chapter 13 debtors face an increasing array of debts that are not dischargeable upon completion of payments under the plan, including educational loans described in § 523(a)(8),32 restitution and fines included in a sentence upon the debtor’s conviction for a crime33 and claims for personal injury or wrongful death resulting from illegal operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated.34 In any Chapter 13 case in which the debtor is financially unable to pay all claims in full, the debtor can be expected to consider favorable classification of nondischargeable claims.35 One possible separate classification would be a plan that extends beyond 36 months to permit the debtor to pay more (or all) of the nondischargeable claims.


For example, the debtor might pay all unsecured claim holders pro rata during the first 36 months of the plan, then extend the plan, with all payments after 36 months going to a separately classified nondischargeable claim. Such a plan would have to pass unfair-discrimination analysis under § 1322(b)(1).36 In addition, the debtor would have to show cause for the extension beyond 36 months. One court has held that payment in full of a separately classified nondischargeable student loan during the period of extension is insufficient cause when other unsecured claim holders will receive only 34.56 percent during the first 36 months of the plan.37 Another court refused a debtor’s proposal to make payments for 49 months based on lack of good faith when the extension would pay nondischargeable traffic tickets in full with no payment to other unsecured claim holders, but the debtor could extend the plan to 60 months and benefit all unsecured claims.38


Given the basic preference in the Code for 36-month plans and that unsecured claim holders cannot compel a Chapter 13 debtor to commit projected disposable income beyond 36 months, it seems appropriate for plans to use the period between 36 and 60 months to deal with claims that survive discharge and diminish the debtor’s fresh start.39 Other unsecured claim holders are not hurt by extension beyond 36 months. The debtor typically is entitled to discharge all dischargeable claims at the completion of a 36-month plan. That the debtor benefits from additional payment of a nondischargeable claim should weigh in favor of cause for the extension.


Cause for extension might also include consideration that some nondischargeable claims accumulate postpetition interest. For example, payment in full of a nondischargeable educational loan through an extended Chapter 13 plan may permit the debtor to pay postpetition interest to the claim holder.40 If the debtor cannot pay the educational loan in full during the first 36 months and if extension is refused, the balance survives discharge and the debtor exits Chapter 13 obligated to pay all accumulated interest.41


Debts for alimony, maintenance or support are candidates for payment through an extended Chapter 13 plan. In Chapter 13 cases filed after October 22, 1994, alimony, maintenance and support described in § 507(a)(7) are priority claims entitled to full payment under § 1322(a)(2).42 Debts for alimony, maintenance or support have always been nondischargeable in Chapter 13 cases.43 This combination of characteristics—priority, full payment and nondischargeability—gives debtors good arguments for extension beyond 36 months whenever the debtor owes alimony, maintenance or support and cannot pay all priority claims in full within 36 months.


Perhaps the most that can be drawn from the plan extension cases is that counsel should be prepared to present as many reasons as possible in support of a request for an extension. The debtor’s desire to pay a greater percentage to unsecured claim holders, standing alone, will not be enough in some jurisdictions. Though the logic of this outcome is not altogether clear—especially when no creditor objects to the extension—counsel is best advised to explain the extension in terms of other goals, such as managing a mortgage arrearage or priority claim, avoiding objections to confirmation from the holder of a nondischargeable claim, dealing with good-faith problems or the like.


Unsecured creditors rarely object to extension of a Chapter 13 plan beyond three years. For unsecured claim holders with dischargeable claims, extension usually means more money than would be realized through a shorter plan or if confirmation is denied altogether.


A secured claim holder with depreciating collateral may be prejudiced by extension if the debtor proposes to pay the allowed claim over a longer period than the expected useful life of the collateral. When the collateral is durable enough to provide security during the extension period, the more important issue becomes the adequacy of the interest rate on the secured claim. If the rate offered by the debtor is at or above what the creditor would realize in the nonbankruptcy marketplace, and the collateral is insured, the creditor may do well to acquiesce to a modest extension.


1  11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c), redesignated by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 301, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994)).


2  Andrews v. Loheit (In re Andrews), 155 B.R. 769 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (Debtor offered no facts to support extension to 45 months, thus bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in declining to confirm a plan that exceeded 36 months.), aff’d, 49 F.3d 1404 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Minor, 16 B.R. 147 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Nickels, 4 B.R. 481 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Fizer, 1 B.R. 400 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1979).


3  See In re Cadogan, 4 B.R. 598 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980) (Plan not confirmed because debtor failed to solicit court approval for extension beyond three years.).


4  Tillman v. Lombard (In re Lombard), 156 B.R. 156 (E.D. Va. 1993). Accord United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Witt (In re Witt), 199 B.R. 890, 892 (W.D. Va. 1996) (“In this case, the Bankruptcy Court made only an implicit ruling that cause existed to extend the plan beyond the generally allowable three year period and failed to state any findings of fact which justified the extension. . . . [T]he case must be remanded to the Bankruptcy Court on this issue so that a hearing on cause pursuant to § 1322(d) can be undertaken.”), aff’d on other grounds, 113 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1997).


5  In re Weiss, 251 B.R. 453, 466 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000) (“‘[P]ermission to extend plan-periods beyond three years should be freely given when any reasonable justification for same is articulated by the debtor.’ In light of the fact that the IRS will be duly compensated for any delays in payment caused by plan extension beyond three years through the remittance of additional post-petition interest, it will be hard-pressed to overcome any justification whatsoever articulated for same.”).


6  In re Baker, 129 B.R. 127 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (In the context of a good-faith objection to confirmation, §§ 1322(c) [redesignated as § 1322(d) by Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 301, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994)] and 1325(b) are indicative of strong congressional intent that the usual Chapter 13 case will have a repayment term of 36 months. That the debtor could extend a plan beyond 36 months and substantially increase dividends to unsecured claim holders is a factor appropriately considered as part of the totality of circumstances. However, it is a relatively weak factor that will not by itself support a finding of a lack of good faith. A blanket rule prohibiting composition plans of only 36 months would violate congressional intent.); In re Frank, 69 B.R. 129 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986) (Inability to pay more than 0% or a minimal payment to unsecured claim holders because all disposable income is going to priority creditors, attorneys’ fees and costs does not constitute cause for extending the plan beyond three years.); In re Festa, 65 B.R. 85 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (Debtor’s desire to increase the dividend to general unsecured claim holders, without more, does not constitute “cause” for exceeding the prescribed 36-month period.); In re Greer, 60 B.R. 547 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (A more substantial payment to unsecured claim holders does not by itself qualify as “cause” for extension beyond three years. This interpretation of § 1322(c) [redesignated as § 1322(d) by Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 301, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994)] is bolstered by the 1984 addition of the disposable income test in § 1325(b).).


7  See discussion of projected disposable income test beginning at § 91.1  In General.


8  In re Walsh, 224 B.R. 231, 237–38 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1998) (Extension of plan beyond 36 months is a method to satisfy disposable income test where debtors propose to keep a car that is not reasonable or necessary. “In analyzing a case to determine whether confirmation is appropriate, the trustee should consider the reasonable budget amount to be paid for an item such as a car and require that any excess proposed to be paid by the debtor to a secured creditor be funded by an extension of the plan beyond 36 months. . . . [T]he Court is not requiring the debtors to extend the duration of plans in order to fund a dividend to unsecured creditors. Instead, any such extension would be made, if at all, for the purpose of funding a payment which exceeds the reasonable amount which would be appropriate for that item in the budget of that debtor. . . . The only remedy to a debtor who prefers to retain such property is to fund a plan for a duration in excess of 36 months sufficient to accomplish the payment of the dividend required by the 36-month disposable income analysis.”).


9  In re Pierce, 82 B.R. 874, 884 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (Expressing disagreement with In re Festa, 65 B.R. 85 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986), In re Greer, 60 B.R. 547 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) and In re Poff, 7 B.R. 15 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980), “if debtors, for whatever sincere and honest reason, request confirmation of a plan lasting longer than three years to permit paying unsecured creditors a higher dividend, and thereby are able to enhance their post-bankruptcy credit rating or fulfill some moral commitment, this court will not deny them that opportunity.”).


10  See In re Cushman, 217 B.R. 470 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998) (In the context of a good-faith objection to confirmation, debtor failed to show cause for extension of plan for 48 months where, after discharge in a prior Chapter 7 case, plan proposes to split a car lender’s in rem claim and pay the secured portion over 48 months notwithstanding that budget demonstrates sufficient disposable income to maintain the contract payments on the car loan and to pay the surviving car lien in full without extending the plan beyond 36 months.); In re Lindsey, 122 B.R. 157, 159 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (Cause is not shown for extension beyond 36 months when the debtors required the additional time to provide payment to unsecured creditors, because all payments during the first 34 months went to rescue an investment property from foreclosure and to protect that property from the IRS. Payments to general unsecured claim holders were to begin after the mortgage on the investment property was paid in full and after the IRS was paid. There was “no incentive to the debtor to continue the plan after the first 34 payments so the unsecured creditors will in fact realize their payments . . . . [T]his payment scheme . . . falls far short of constituting cause for approving and extending the plan to 50 months.”); In re Rogers, 65 B.R. 1018, 1022 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (When plan would pay nothing to unsecured claim holders in three years and debtor appears to have proposed four-year plan merely to “lull unsecured creditors and the court into thinking that the debtor is making her best efforts to pay,” cause is not found for extension beyond three years.).


11  Hart v. Bowers, Nos. 00-82795, 01-4003, 2001 WL 34076355, at *2–*3 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2001) (unpublished) (Quoting from the bankruptcy court opinion: “Based upon this Court’s interpretation of § 1322(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, it believes that a valid purpose is served by the established procedure and that Chapter 13 Standing Trustees should continue to object to plans that provide for a term longer than three years with less than a 70% dividend to unsecured creditors.”); In re Karayan, 82 B.R. 541 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (Chapter 13 plan will not be extended beyond 36 months just to increase payments to creditors. Plan may be extended if extension will permit payment of at least 70% or will allow the debtor to discharge an otherwise nondischargeable debt if the debtor commits all projected disposable income pursuant to § 1325(b). Cause is found for extension to 55 months to pay taxes that could not be satisfied within 36 months.); In re Tate, 85 B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (In dicta, cause for extension may be found where the debtor can preserve a subsequent Chapter 7 discharge by paying a dividend of at least 70% through a longer plan.); In re Poff, 7 B.R. 15 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (Congress intended “for cause” extension only when a longer plan was necessary to pay a substantial dividend to creditors. To secure confirmation of a plan longer than three years, debtor must propose at least 70% dividend to the least favored class of unsecured claim holders.). See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9)(B).


12  In re Colston, 11 B.R. 251 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (Plan is allowed to extend over four years to provide 100% payment of unsecured claims.). See In re Robertson, 84 B.R. 109 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Stein, 18 B.R. 768 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Powell, 15 B.R. 465 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Caudle, 13 B.R. 29 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Blackwell, 5 B.R. 748 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980).


13  Villanueva v. Dowell (In re Villanueva), 274 B.R. 836, 842 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002).


14  No. 02-30336-H2-13, 2002 WL 31833254 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2002) (unpublished).


15  2002 WL 31833254, at *5.


16  Nos. 00-82795, 01-4003, 2001 WL 34076355 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2001) (unpublished).


17  2001 WL 34076355, at *2–*3.


18  In re Norris, 165 B.R. 515 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (There is cause for extension to 60 months where plan cannot pay priority and secured claims within 36 months. However, debtors must pay all disposable income during the 24 extension months to satisfy § 1325(b)(1).); In re Masterson, 147 B.R. 295 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992) (Cause is found for extension to 60 months when debtor is unable to cure arrearages on a home mortgage in any shorter time.); GMAC v. Chapman (In re Chapman), 135 B.R. 11 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1990) (There is cause for extension to 60 months because the debtors need the 60-month period to pay the IRS as a priority creditor.); In re Tate, 85 B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (In dicta, cause for extension may be found when there are large unsecured tax debts that cannot be repaid in less than 36 months.); In re Fries, 68 B.R. 676 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (When payment of priority claims, secured claims and mortgage delinquencies will require approximately 49 months, debtors have demonstrated cause for extension to 60 months to produce a dividend of almost 20% for the unsecured claim holders.).


19  In re Raikes, 22 B.R. 837 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982).


20  In re Karayan, 82 B.R. 541 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (Court may approve extending payments beyond 36 months to manage nondischargeable debt.); In re Tate, 85 B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (Significant repayment of an arguably nondischargeable unsecured claim could be cause for extending payments beyond 36 months. However, debtor must show incapacity to make the proposed payments in a 36-month plan, and cause for extension is not demonstrated when the debtor has significant surplus income that could be used to fund a shorter plan. In dicta, cause for extension may be found when more than 36 months is needed to pay the value of assets that would be available in a liquidation under Chapter 7, when there are large unsecured tax debts that cannot be repaid in less than 36 months, when classification of a significant co-signed obligation is necessary to protect a family member or a friend and when the debtor can preserve a subsequent Chapter 7 discharge by paying a dividend of at least 70% through a longer plan. When redemption of assets by payment of secured claims requires a period in excess of 36 months, the court will more carefully scrutinize the proposed extension beyond 36 months.); In re Todd, 65 B.R. 249 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (“Cause” to extend beyond three years may be found in Chapter 13 cases involving debts that would be nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 case.).


21  National City Bank v. Purdy, 16 B.R. 847 (N.D. Ga. 1981).


22  Philadelphia Sav. Fund Soc’y v. Stewart, 16 B.R. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Mortgage arrearages justified extension to three years and four months.). Accord In re Donahue, 221 B.R. 105, 113 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998) (“We have held and will continue to hold that every chapter 13 plan proposing to extend payments for more than three years must be looked at on a case by case basis. Debtor’s plan proposes to cure a long term mortgage obligation over 60 months. This is sufficient cause to allow Debtor to extend his plan.”), rev’d on other grounds, 232 B.R. 610 (D. Vt. 1999).


23  In re Eury, 11 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981). See In re Harris, 132 B.R. 166 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1991) (Cause is shown for extending plan from three years to five years “because of [debtor’s] income and circumstances.”).


24  In re Strong, 12 B.R. 221 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1981).


25  In re Hockaday, 3 B.R. 254 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).


26  In re Mothershed, 62 B.R. 113 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986).


27  In re Collins, 19 B.R. 209 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).


28  In re Santa Maria, 128 B.R. 32 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1991).


29  In re DeMoss, 59 B.R. 90, 94 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (Upon debtor’s motion to modify a plan after confirmation under § 1329 to extend the time for payments, “if the sole reason presented for the extension is to give the debtor a better chance of rehabilitation, then this court must deny the extension. There must be some special supporting reason.”); In re Price, 20 B.R. 253, 255 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981) (“Better chance to rehabilitate himself” is an insufficient reason to extend debtor’s plan to five years when payment to unsecured claim holders is only 5%.).


30  In re Moss, 5 B.R. 123 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).


31  See discussion of discharge beginning at § 157.1  Broadest Discharge Available.


32  See § 346.1 [ Student Loans ] § 158.2  Student Loans.


33  See § 348.1 [ Criminal Restitution and Criminal Fines ] § 158.4  Criminal Restitution and Criminal Fines.


34  See § 347.1 [ Driving While Intoxicated ] § 158.3  Driving while Intoxicated.


35  See discussion of separate classification of nondischargeable claims beginning at § 88.1  In General. 


36  See § 149.1 [ Power to Classify Unsecured Claims: Tests for Unfair Discrimination ] § 87.1  Power to Classify Unsecured Claims: Tests for Unfair Discrimination.


37  In re Taylor, 137 B.R. 60 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992).


38  In re Games, 213 B.R. 773, 780 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1997) (Refuses extension to 49 months based on lack of good faith in debtors’ proposal to pay nondischargeable traffic tickets in full with no payment to other unsecured claim holders; ironically, court would find cause to extend the plan to 60 months. “In considering whether it should authorize extension of the plan along the lines proposed by the Debtors, the court has examined whether the proposal was filed in good faith. It has concluded that it was not. Therefore the court declines to authorize the extension of the plan’s term to 49 months. If the Debtors should choose to modify their plan to extend it to the full 60 months allowed under the statute, they will have resolved the court’s concerns about their good faith in proposing a plan, the court would accordingly find sufficient cause for extension of the term of the plan beyond 36 months. If the Debtors wish to obtain the benefits of a chapter 13 they must shoulder the burdens.”).


39  See § 159.1 [ A Proposal: Simpler Rules for Classification of Unsecured Claims ] § 89.10  A Proposal: Simpler Rules for Classification of Unsecured Claims.


40  See §§ 153.1 [ Student Loans ] § 88.6  Student Loans, 155.2 [ Long-Term Debts ] § 88.9  Long-Term Debts and 159.1 [ A Proposal: Simpler Rules for Classification of Unsecured Claims ] § 89.10  A Proposal: Simpler Rules for Classification of Unsecured Claims.


41  See § 346.1 [ Student Loans ] § 158.2  Student Loans. See, e.g., Leeper v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 49 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 1995) (Unmatured, postpetition interest on a nondischargeable student loan is not allowable as a claim and is nondischargeable after payment of other creditors.); In re Shelbayah, 165 B.R. 332 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (Unmatured postpetition interest on a student loan continues to accrue and has the same nondischargeable character as the underlying student loan.).


42  See § 301.1 [ Alimony, Maintenance and Support in Cases Filed after October 22, 1994 ] § 136.20  Alimony, Maintenance and Support in Cases Filed after October 22, 1994.


43  See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) and (c), discussed in §§ 345.1 [ Alimony, Maintenance or Support ] § 158.1  Alimony, Maintenance or Support and 354.1 [ Exceptions to Hardship Discharge ] § 160.6  Exceptions to Hardship Discharge before BAPCPA. Note that the debts for alimony, maintenance or support entitled to priority under § 507(a)(7) are not quite coextensive with the debts that are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5) (incorporated into Chapter 13 by § 1328(a)(2) and (c)(2)). Alimony, maintenance or support debts assigned to state or federal agencies or assigned pursuant to the Social Security Act are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5) but are not entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7). See §§ 301.1 [ Alimony, Maintenance and Support in Cases Filed after October 22, 1994 ] § 136.20  Alimony, Maintenance and Support in Cases Filed after October 22, 1994 and 345.1 [ Alimony, Maintenance or Support ] § 158.1  Alimony, Maintenance or Support.