§ 162.6 — Reopening Closed Cases
Revised: April 6, 2010
This section is currently being revised.
Woide v. Federal Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n (In re Woide), 730 F. App'x 731 (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 2018) (unpublished) (Marcus, Jordan, Rosenbaum) (Bankruptcy court appropriately reopened case to allow FNMA to seek surrender of debtor’s home. In Chapter 13 case before conversion debtor indicated intent to surrender home. Case converted to Chapter 7 and debtors did not file a statement of intent consistent with § 521. Discharge was entered and Chapter 7 case was closed. FNMA eventually obtained an order reopening the Chapter 7 case so it could ask for surrender. FNMA had standing to seek reopening and to demand surrender of property.).
In re Hawkins, No. 14-1049, 2015 WL 545321, at *1-*2 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 2015) (unpublished) (Rendell, Greenaway, Scirica) (Unscheduled creditor lacks standing to reopen completed Chapter 13 case more than two years after entry of discharge. "Over two years later, [after discharge], Allen filed a motion to reopen the bankruptcy case . . . . She stated that she and the Conaways were creditors who were intentionally omitted from the bankruptcy schedules. Allen asserted that the debt was non-dischargeable based upon the debtors' fraud . . . . The Bankruptcy Court . . . denied the motion because it was untimely under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(e), which allows a motion to reopen based on fraud to be filed within one year of a discharge. . . . The District Court explained that the order at issue denied a motion to reopen, which sought to vacate the debtors' discharge so that a non-dischargeability complaint could be filed. This order did not direct an administration of the estate, but recognized that the estate had been fully administered and that the motion to reopen was untimely. The District Court concluded, and we agree, that the Bankruptcy Court's order does not have a direct, pecuniary effect upon Allen and the Conaways.").
Rainey v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 11-3106, 2012 WL 753680 (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 2012) (unpublished) (Posner, Wood, Tinder) (When case was reopened to pursue previously undisclosed cause of action for discrimination by employer, debtor should be given opportunity to notify trustee of cause of action, and unless trustee elects to abandon asset, debtor may litigate claims on behalf of estate and for benefit of creditors.).
Imler v. Combs-Skinner, No. 11-3140, 2012 WL 587501 (7th Cir. Feb. 23, 2012) (unpublished) (Easterbrook, Bauer, Sykes) (Five-year delay seeking to reopen and final state court judgment rendered attack on award of fees to attorneys futile.), aff'g, No. 11-CV-2117, 2011 WL 3678906 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2011) (unpublished) (McCuskey) (Motion to reopen case to introduce new evidence on objection to attorney fees was properly denied when complaints about attorney fees were or could have been raised during case.), aff'g, No. 02-90582, 2011 WL 240469 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2011) (Fines) (Applying Redmond v. Fifth Third Bank, 624 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. Oct. 20, 2010) (Easterbrook, Kanne, Sykes), motion to reopen discharged and closed case is denied when debtors delayed five years and challenge they wish to raise to state court judgment is more appropriately raised in other courts.).
Redmond v. Fifth Third Bank, 624 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. Oct. 20, 2010) (Easterbrook, Kanne, Sykes) (Motion to reopen Chapter 13 case was appropriately denied four years after closing when motion was delaying tactic in seven-year-old foreclosure dispute. Payoff letter did not violate automatic stay, and foreclosure was not a violation of the discharge injunction. "The decision to reopen a bankruptcy case is within the broad discretion of the bankruptcy court. . . . A bankruptcy court may, for example, reopen a case for 'the correction of errors, amendments necessitated by unanticipated events that frustrate a plan's implementation, and the need to enforce the plan and discharge.' . . . A bankruptcy judge may consider a number of nonexclusive factors in determining whether to reopen, including (1) the length of time that the case has been closed; (2) whether the debtor would be entitled to relief if the case were reopened; and (3) the availability of nonbankruptcy courts, such as state courts, to entertain the claims."), aff'g 380 B.R. 179 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2007) (Wedoff) (Pointing out distinction between reinstatement of dismissed cases and reopening of fully administered, closed cases, debtor's motion to reopen case eight years after discharge is denied, when debtor disputes amount of balloon note not satisfied in plan. Under § 1322(e), debt is determined under state law, and state courts have jurisdiction to decide issues.).
Binette v. Bangor Sav. Bank (In re Binette), No. EP 18-015, 2019 WL 1402731 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Mar. 26, 2019) (Godoy, Harwood, Katz) (Four years after discharge and closing of Chapter 13 case, reopening would be futile under § 350 because debtors claim inaccurately that bank violated the discharge injunction by claiming a lien against property owned by a “disincorporated” third-party entity. Debtors took no action during the Chapter 13 case to void the lien and discharge did not affect bank’s rights against the corporate entity.).
Arriola v. Naylor (In re Arriola), Nos. CC-15-1092-KuFTa, CC-15-1121-KuFTa, 2016 WL 1384788 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2016) (unpublished) (Kurtz, Faris, Taylor) (Bankruptcy court correctly denied debtor's motion to reopen 2009 Chapter 7 case to relitigate issues with Bank of America that were decided against debtor in Chapter 13 case that was filed in 2010.).
Woodard v. City of Philadelphia, 558 B.R. 711 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2016) (Alejandro) (Seven and a half years after completion of payments and discharge, closed Chapter 13 case is reopened for adversary proceeding in which bankruptcy court appropriately declared that City did not violate stay or confirmed plan when it accepted payments from property sale proceeds during the Chapter 13 case.).
Saxon Mortgage Servicing, Inc. v. Dimogerodakis (In re Dimogerodakis), No. 10-0004 (KSH), 2011 WL 1362342 (D.N.J. Apr. 11, 2011) (unpublished) (Hayden) (Motion to reopen was appropriately denied when mortgage creditor failed to seek collection of escrow advances until after merger of mortgage contract into foreclosure judgment and no exception to merger doctrine was present.), aff'g No. 04-23822(DHS), 2009 WL 2905376 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2009) (unpublished) (Steckroth) (Citing Stendardo v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n (In re Stendardo), 991 F.2d 1089 (3d Cir. June 21, 1993) (Mansmann, Hutchinson, Garth), mortgage creditor cannot reopen discharged case to recover escrow advances made during Chapter 13 case because creditor was granted relief to foreclose, and under New Jersey law, foreclosure merged mortgage contract into judgment; debtor no longer had obligation to pay insurance and taxes, and escrow advances were solely for benefit of creditor.).
Darnley v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. 06-CV-4265 (DLI), 2010 WL 1037971 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010) (Irizarry) (Pro se debtor's repeated attempt to reopen case to vacate judgment of foreclosure is denied with certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be in good faith.).
Mohorne v. Beal Bank, S.S.B., 419 B.R. 488 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2009) (Altonaga) (Bankruptcy court properly denied debtor's motion to reopen case closed five years earlier when Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevented reconsideration of validity of mortgage determined in foreclosure judgment. Debtor had filed subsequent bankruptcy case and had no need to reopen long-closed case.).
Finch v. Coop, No. 4:09CV00269 JMM, 2009 WL 10695240 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 15, 2009) (Moody) (Pro se motion to reopen Chapter 13 case filed three years after dismissal was actually an untimely challenge to the order of dismissal; district court lacked jurisdiction to consider appeal of bankruptcy court order denying reopening.).
In re Lockings, No. 06-04837, 2008 WL 686398, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2008) (unpublished) (Golden) (Debtor's motion to reopen Chapter 13 case to address stay violation is denied because debtor had no ownership interest in property that was foreclosed. Property was titled in other entities, including corporation, and debtor's shareholder interest did not equate to property interest in foreclosed property.).
In re Hoffman, No. 13-60831, 2019 WL 1271457 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2019) (Connelly) (Closed Chapter 13 case can be reopened to permit Chapter 13 trustee to disburse to creditors money returned to the trustee after discharge and closing of the case. A student loan creditor granted the debtor a disability discharge of debt after completion of payments, discharge and closing of the Chapter 13 case and returned some funds to the trustee. Debtor sought to modify the plan after reopening to capture those funds by reducing the distribution to unsecured creditors. Debtor cannot modify the plan after reopening because the debtor completed payments before the case was closed. All parties are bound by confirmation and returned funds are properly redistributed to other creditors consistent with the confirmed plan.).
In re Phillips, No. 18-00618, 2019 WL 548524, at *1 (Bankr. D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2019) (Teel) (Not appropriate to reopen prior case to merge with current case to avoid termination of stay in current case under § 362(c)(3). Reopening a prior case to merge with current case is not appropriate because debtor failed to file documents necessary to maintain prior case and has shown no ground for relief from dismissal order in prior case. “The only reason the court can find to explain why the debtor would want to merge the above-captioned case with the now pending case . . . is to avoid the automatic termination of the automatic stay after 30 days of the filing of a second case within a year under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3). However, this is the wrong course of action for extending the automatic stay, which expired . . . with the debtor having failed to file a motion to extend the automatic stay.”).
In re Syed, No. 10-82047-WRS, 2018 WL 6436271, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Dec. 4, 2018) (Sawyer) (Chapter 13 debtor can reopen case after discharge to avoid judicial lien under § 522(f). After doing math, judgment lien is entirely avoidable against homestead and partially avoidable against personal property. “To determine the extent to which the exemption is impaired, we add $218,935.77 (sum of the BB & T Mortgage), $174,188.00 (sum of the judgment lien), $5,000 (the homestead exemption), then subtract $212,230.00 (debtor’s interest in the property absent liens). This total is $185,893.77[,] which is greater than $174,188.00 (the lien sought to be avoided). . . . [T]he judgment lien on the house is avoided in full. . . . When determining the extent to which the [personal property] exemption is impaired, the court adds $600 (BB & T Car Loan), $174,188.00 (the judgment lien), $3,000 (the personal property exemption), then subtracts $11,078.53 (the debtor[’]s interest in the personal property absent liens). This total is $166,709.53, which is less than $174,188.00 (the lien sought to be avoided). Thus, the lien is not avoidable in full. Instead, the debtor may avoid the lien except for $7,478.47 ($174,188.00 minus $166,709.53).”).
In re Williams, No. 12-82275, 2018 WL 6287968 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2018) (Altenberger) (After completion of payments and discharge in a Chapter 13 case that paid 100% to unsecured creditors, debtors moved to reopen to schedule employment action that arose during the Chapter 13 case. Finding no motive for the debtors to have concealed the cause of action or to have gamed the judicial system, bankruptcy court allows the reopening and amendment of schedules, leaving to district court to determine whether debtors are judicially estopped to maintain the employment action.).
In re Woods, No. 14-62176, 2018 WL 2021254, at *2–*3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2018) (unpublished) (Kendig) (Motion to reopen and to waive filing fee is denied when debtors filed untimely DSO statement for purposes of § 1328(h) and bankruptcy court closed case without discharge pursuant to local administrative order. Motion to reopen was filed two years after closing, perhaps because no deficiency notice was sent by the clerk’s office. Bankruptcy Rule 5009 does not help debtors notwithstanding that case was closed before expiration of 30-day objection period based on trustee’s final report. “Debtors’ motion to reopen is not timely. It was filed two years after the case closed. There is no explanation for the delay. Debtors have offered absolutely no explanation for their failure to timely file the end-of-case documents. . . . Debtors ignore the limitation imposed by this court in AO 08–06 which states that the documents are due twenty-eight (28) days after the trustee’s Notice is filed. . . . They were filed over one month later, outside the deadline, and after the case closed. Nothing in Rule 5009(a) operates to extend deadlines established by bankruptcy rules or court orders. . . . The trustee certified ‘the estate has been fully administered’ in her final report. . . . This representation creates an independent foundation for a court to close the case. . . . Debtors’ motion to reopen is denied[.]”).
In re Tucker, No. 10-00628-CW-13, 2018 WL 378887 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. Jan. 11, 2018) (Walker) (After completion of payments and discharge, Chapter 13 case is reopened to allow debtor to recover a refund check from a creditor issued to the debtor and the trustee. The refund should be paid to the debtor, not to unsecured creditors, in absence of evidence that funds were an overpayment during administration of the plan.).
In re Gierlinger, 580 B.R. 314 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2017) (Bucki) (Six years after completion of payments, discharge and closing, Chapter 13 case is reopened to avoid judgment lien under § 522(f); postdischarge efforts by lienholder to renew judgment were not contemptuous of discharge injunction because debtor caused the whole problem by neglecting to avoid the lien earlier.).
In re Leahey, No. 11-11906-ABA, 2017 WL 4286136, at *2 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2017) (Altenburg) (Motion to reopen closed Chapter 13 case to disclose and administer a lawsuit that arose during the case is denied because plan has been completed, plan cannot be modified to liquidate and distribute proceeds from the lawsuit and reopening would be futile. Chapter 13 case was filed in January 2011. Zero percent plan was confirmed in March 2011 and completed in December 2015. Discharge was entered in May 2016 and case was closed in June 2016. In August 2017 debtors moved to reopen to liquidate a lawsuit that arose in 2013 that was filed in the district court in 2014 but never disclosed in the Chapter 13 case. “This court . . . denied their motion to reopen because their plan would have to be modified to account for the additional distribution, but a chapter 13 plan may not exceed 60 months. . . . [R]eopening is futile because section 1329(a) provides that once a plan is completed, regardless of original length, it cannot be modified.”).
In re Makell, No. 16-00480, 2017 WL 2889634, at *1 (Bankr. D.D.C. July 6, 2017) (unpublished) (Teel) (Motion to reopen seven months after dismissal is denied; debtor failed to complete credit counseling prior to the petition. “[E]ven if the case were reopened, the order of dismissal would remain in place unless vacated. A motion to vacate the order of dismissal would fall under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c) such a motion must be made within a reasonable time. In no way, in the circumstances of this case, can pursuing such relief seven months after the case was dismissed be deemed pursuing such relief within a reasonable time. Both the debtor and her attorney were well aware that the case had been dismissed, and if the debtor wished to have the dismissal of the case set aside, the debtor should have promptly filed a motion to vacate the dismissal order. . . . [T]he debtor would have long ago been required to file a plan and to make plan payments. A dismissal would be appropriate based on the long delay in filing a plan and making plan payments.”).
In re Roberts, 570 B.R. 532, 539 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. May 1, 2017) (Ellington) (Chapter 13 case closed after completion of payments and discharge can be reopened to administer settlement proceeds from an undisclosed asset notwithstanding that the debtor died. In 2002 debtor was one of 93 plaintiffs in a state court lawsuit. In 2003 debtor filed Chapter 13 without revealing the lawsuit. Debtor completed plan payments in 2007, was discharged and the case closed. During Chapter 13 case, the state court action settled. In 2015 the Chapter 13 trustee moved to reopen the Chapter 13 case and filed an adversary proceeding to recover the settlement proceeds. “[W]hen the Debtors filed their bankruptcy petition, they qualified as debtors under the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtors completed their plan payments and received their discharge. After the Debtor died, the case was reopened by the Trustee in order to administer an undisclosed asset. . . . The Debtors qualified at the time they filed bankruptcy and nothing in the Bankruptcy Code requires the Debtors to re-qualify now that their case has been reopened to administer an undisclosed asset of the bankruptcy estate.”).
In re Oliver, No. 07-50836, 2017 WL 1323467 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Apr. 10, 2017) (Samson) (Second motion to “reconsider” order denying motion to reopen is denied when purpose of reopening—to file a complaint objecting to dischargeability—would be time barred.).
In re Oliver, No. 07-50836, 2017 WL 825293, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2017) (Samson) (Bankruptcy court refuses to reconsider order denying reopening of Chapter 13 case when reason for reopening is to file a nondischargeability complaint that would be time barred. “The Court found no cause to reopen the case because Howard would be barred from bringing a nondischargeability complaint because he received ‘actual notice of the bankruptcy approximately seventeen days, at the latest, before the bar date[which] was sufficient notice to permit Howard to take steps to protect his rights[.]’”), amended and superseded, No. 07-50836, 2017 WL 1323467 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Apr. 10, 2017) (Samson).).
In re Heinbuch, No. 06-60670, 2016 WL 1417913, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2016) (Kendig) (Punishing the debtor and only the debtor, court denied motion to reopen Chapter 13 case closed seven years earlier without entry of discharge when debtor failed to provide certificate of completion of postpetition financial management course. Motion to reopen was not accompanied by explanation for delay. "[F]iling the motion seven years after the case closed is untimely . . . . Debtor did not provide any foundation for her request and therefore cannot meet her burden of proof. There is no evidence persuading the court to exercise its discretion to enlarge the time for filing the financial management certificate Debtor recently obtained.").
In re Ingram, 531 B.R. 121 (Bankr. D.S.C. May 14, 2015) (Duncan) (Reopening completed Chapter 13 case to add unscheduled postpetition cause of action denied when creditors will not benefit: 60-month length limitation has expired, plan cannot be amended to increase payments to creditors in event of recovery and trustee cannot administer the asset because of § 1306(b).).
In re Rising, No. 07-50123, 2015 WL 393416, at *3 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Jan. 8, 2015) (James) (Motion to reopen three years after completion of payments and closing without discharge is granted when debtor delivered all missing documents necessary to close with discharge to attorney but mistake in attorney's office resulted in closing without discharge. "[T]he Debtor timely completed her financial management course and filed the appropriate certificate with the court. Acting in good faith, the Debtor also completed, signed, and delivered all of the required paperwork to her attorney. The requisite motion was simply not filed with the court. The Court has considered and finds no prejudice to any party, as it appears that no action has been taken by any creditor since the closing of the case. . . . Although the delay is both significant and without reasonable explanation, under the circumstances of this case, including the absence of any prejudice to creditors as well as the absence of fault on the part of the Debtor, . . . the Court finds in the exercise of its discretion that the Debtor's Motion to Reopen the case for the purpose of allowing the Debtor to file a motion for entry of discharge should be granted.").
In re Janocha, No. 06-20191JAD, 2015 WL 128152 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2015) (Deller) (Motion to reopen completed Chapter 13 case three years after discharge denied when relief sought—relief from automatic stay—was futile and enforcement of equitable lien could be addressed in state court.).
In re Scheib, No. 97-25582JAD, 2014 WL 5454206 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2014) (Deller) (Appeal of denial of motion to reopen 17-year-old bankruptcy case was frivolous and in bad faith, precluding debtors' motion to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.).
In re Mahkovic, No. 12-70612-JAD, 2014 WL 4345962 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2014) (Deller) (Reopening dismissed case denied when the relief from prepetition foreclosure which debtor sought was barred by res judicata and Rooker-Feldman doctrine.).
In re Cunningham, 506 B.R. 334 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2014) (Craig) (Reopening allowed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) when foreclosing creditor, through no fault of its own, did not have notice or knowledge of case, completed sale to third party before it learned of case, and had no recourse to state court to seek annulment of automatic stay.).
In re Owsley, 494 B.R. 321 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. May 29, 2013) (Stair) (Reopening closed Chapter 13 case would be futile because child support debt was nondischargeable and could be collected from debtor after discharge notwithstanding that confirmed plan treated the debt as a general unsecured claim that was partially paid during the plan.).
In re Easley-Brooks, 487 B.R. 400 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013) (Glenn) (Reopening would benefit creditors by allowing trustee to pursue undisclosed cause of action. Conversion was in bad faith when debtor did not disclose medical malpractice claim arising postpetition.).
In re James, 487 B.R. 587 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2013) (Murphy) (Case reopened three years after closing to allow scheduling of undisclosed cause of action to prevent application of judicial estoppel by state court. Creditors had been paid 100% in completed plan and would not benefit from reopening, but debtor lacked motive to conceal claim. Trustee had declined to pursue cause of action that would serve no creditor purpose.).
In re D'Antignac, No. 05-10620, 2013 WL 1084214 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2013) (Barrett) (No purpose would be served to reopen case that was discharged and closed in 2009 when five-year plan length limitation would preclude distribution of any proceeds of unscheduled litigation. EEOC defendant in district court action was not party in interest for purposes of opposing reopening of closed case. District court could determine if judicial estoppel prevented pursuit of unscheduled cause of action.).
In re Johnson, No. 6:11-bk-17111-ABB, 2012 WL 1509080 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2012) (Briskman) (Closed Chapter 7 case was reopened to vacate discharge and allow conversion to Chapter 13; debtor was not seeking lien strip or cramdown, and conversion was not abusive.).
In re Duran, No. 11-35966, 2012 WL 272736 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 2012) (Speer) (Motion to reopen case denied when Debtors had seven previous cases, had received prior Chapter 7 discharge, but continued to incur substantial unsecured debt.).
In re Martin, No. 05-80116, 2011 WL 4344441 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2011) (Akard) (Motion for relief from dismissal order is not appropriate under § 350(b); debtor failed to show cause for setting aside dismissal.).
In re Hambrick, No. 09-81378-TRC, 2011 WL 2144426 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. May 31, 2011) (Cornish) (Case was reopened to address discharge injunction violations. Motion was not untimely.).
In re Coffee, No. 07-12822-WHD, 2011 WL 3856996 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 2011) (Drake) (Motion to reopen case granted to file student loan dischargeability complaint. Motion for temporary restraining order required prior filing of complaint.).
In re Gagne, No. 02-10966, 2010 WL 5209243, at *1 (Bankr. D. Me. Dec. 16, 2010) (Kornreich) (Debtor cannot reopen case closed four years ago to avenge violations of stay during prior case. Discharge had been granted and case was closed in 2006. Debtor attempted to reopen to assert violations of stay by collection harassment during prior case. "The Debtor obviously knew of these alleged actions at the time, but claims to have only recently discovered that such actions may have violated the automatic stay. The Debtor's motion, filed more than four years after his case was closed, is untimely." Court noted that debtor was currently in new Chapter 13 case.).
In re Leitner, No. 09-07900-DD, 2010 WL 5093300, at *3 (Bankr. D.S.C. Dec. 8, 2010) (Duncan) (Debtor's motion to reopen, vacate discharge and convert to Chapter 13 is denied eight months after closing of Chapter 7 case. "Reopening Debtor's case and vacating the discharge, as Debtor suggests should be done, upsets the relief Debtor received as to all of his creditors. Given the passage of time, it is likely that other unsecured creditors will have closed the books on Debtor's accounts and would not have the opportunity to meaningfully participate in a chapter 13 plan. Debtor chose the relief he sought in filing a chapter 7 case. On balance with the interests of his creditors and the public's need for finality in court judgments, Debtor has shown no reason to reopen the case.").
In re Olejnik, No. 09-76714-AST, 2010 WL 4366183 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2010) (Trust) (Incompletely filed case that was automatically dismissed under § 521(i)(1) was not closed after full administration and cannot be reopened under § 350(b); however, applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), cause to reopen included that debtor failed to disclose any interest in real property subject to foreclosure and failed to file necessary documents. Case was reopened to hear creditor's motion for nunc pro tunc stay relief to complete foreclosure.).
In re Johnson, No. 05-38147-BJH-13, 2010 WL 3491187 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2010) (unpublished) (Houser) (U.S. trustee's motion to reopen case four years after closing was not time barred when motion was filed promptly after learning that debtor would receive $40,000 in class action settlement. Code and Rules do not specify time within which to move for reopening. Debtor had omitted cause of action from schedules. Undisclosed asset that was not administered or abandoned by trustee remained property of estate and may be administered after reopening.).
In re Powers, 435 B.R. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 24, 2010) (Jones) (Closed case was reopened to determine that Vioxx settlement proceeds belonged to debtors. Modification of plan was not available because debtors completed plan payments. Settlement proceeds became property of estate, but parties were bound by confirmation and settlement proceeds were turned over to debtors.).
In re Webb, No. 96-74639, 2009 WL 6499125 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2009) (Massey) (Motion to reopen closed case was granted to allow amendment to schedule real estate that was inadvertently omitted. There was no evidence that debtor intentionally omitted the property or that creditors, who were paid 100%, were harmed. With no reason to administer real estate, case would be reclosed upon amendment and interest in parcel would revest in debtor.).
In re Henneghan, No. 03-01216, 2009 WL 2855835 (Bankr. D.D.C. June 15, 2009) (unpublished) (Teel) (Completed and closed Chapter 13 case was reopened to permit debtor's motion to annul automatic stay to validate unscheduled lender liability cause of action filed before entry of discharge. Modification of plan to pay recovery to creditors, including unscheduled creditor, was futile because maximum five-year period under § 1322(d) applied.).
In re Silber, No. 08-40000MG, 2009 WL 2902571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2009) (unpublished) (Glenn) (Reopening under § 350(b) is not available when case was dismissed for failure to make plan payments; § 350(b) is only available when case was closed after full administration.).
In re Mohorne, 404 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. May 6, 2009) (Olson) (Motion to reopen closed case denied when collateral estoppel and Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevented reconsideration of state court determination that bank had valid mortgage.).
In re Janssen, 396 B.R. 624 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2008) (Frank) (Closed case is reopened to permit prosecution of adversary proceeding alleging that mortgage creditor failed to properly allocate plan payments between prepetition arrearage cure and ongoing debt.).
In re Artis, No. 03-20696PM, 2008 WL 4602292 (Bankr. D. Md. Oct. 15, 2008) (Mannes) (Motion to reopen closed case is denied when bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction over postconfirmation dispute between debtor and mortgage creditor.).
In re Finney, No. 05-83587-PWB, 2008 WL 7874260 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. July 1, 2008) (Bonapfel) (Closed case was reopened to determine entitlement to excess funds after foreclosure. Bankruptcy court had granted stay relief to permit foreclosure and had directed that any excess funds be paid to trustee. Since case had been converted to Chapter 7, funds would be held in registry of court pending determination of proper recipients.).
In re Smalis, No. 05-71395JKF, 2005 WL 6761136 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2005) (Fitzgerald) (Motion to reopen case denied when dismissal had been with prejudice to refiling for two years. Debtor had been incarcerated since December 1999, serving 20-year sentence for illegally dumping hazardous waste. Debtor had previous incarceration for fraud and tax evasion and was not eligible for Chapter 13.).
In re Young, No. 98-41950, 2004 WL 6060948 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Nov. 22, 2004) (unpublished) (Davis) (Reopening of closed case denied when there was no need to amend and schedule postpetition cause of action; applying Telfair v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 216 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. July 7, 2000) (Tjoflat, Marcus, Kravitch), postpetition cause of action was not property of estate and was not necessary for completion of successful plan.).