§ 80.7 Mobile Homes

§ 80.7 Mobile Homes
Cite as: Keith M. Lundin, Lundin On Chapter 13, § 80.7, at ¶ ____, LundinOnChapter13.com (last visited __________).

[1]

Several courts have considered whether the prohibition against modification in § 1322(b)(2) applies to claims secured by mobile homes or manufactured housing. These courts have sometimes looked to state law to determine whether a lien on a mobile home is a security interest in real property or a security interest in personal property. State law varies on this issue, and the cases are fact-bound. The nature of the security interest may depend on whether the mobile home remains mobile or whether it has been sufficiently joined to the earth to become real property.

[2]

Under North Carolina law, a mobile home is personal property, and the prohibition against modification in § 1322(b)(2) is not available.1 Under Oklahoma law and Montana law, a mobile home is personal property, and a mobile home mortgage can be modified unless the mobile home is affixed to a particular parcel of real estate.2 Under Tennessee law, a Chapter 13 debtor cannot modify a loan secured by a mobile home that is affixed to realty because the mobile home becomes real property once permanently connected to the land.3 A mobile home on a 10-acre lot in Vermont with “a detached concrete pad, a drilled well and an outhouse” is a principal residence for § 1322(b)(2) purposes notwithstanding that the debtor lacks electric service, potable water or a septic system.4 Applying New York law, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Second Circuit concluded that a mobile home was personalty for purposes of § 1322(b)(2) notwithstanding that New York law permitted a homestead exemption in the mobile home.5 A mobile home loan in Texas is not protected from modification because a mobile home is not regarded as residential real estate under Texas law.6 Applying Missouri law, one bankruptcy court found that a mobile home “totally encased in a permanent exoskeleton of wood” such that “it is impossible to tell that there is a trailer involved at all” was real property and the debt it secured was protected from modification.7

[3]

These cases suggest strategies for debtors with mobile homes. Protection from modification will probably turn on how well the mobile home is connected to the ground. Counsel might be tempted to suggest that the debtor put the wheels back on the frame before filing the Chapter 13 case. Creditor’s counsel should consider taking pictures before the home becomes suddenly mobile.

[4]

The creditor with a security interest in real property that does not have a security interest in the mobile home that sits on that property may be unprotected from modification in a Chapter 13 case. In In re Johnson,8 the bank had a mortgage on real property, and the debtor hauled a mobile home onto the property. The mobile home was not affixed to the land, and the bank did not have a security interest in the mobile home. The bankruptcy court held that the bank was not protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2):

[T]he Debtors’ mobile home is their principal residence which is personal property under Alabama law. . . . [T]he Debtors live in the mobile home which is personal property . . . . The land upon which the mobile home sits is separate from the mobile home and does not constitute the Debtors’ residence. As Regions Bank does not have a security interest in the Debtors’ residence, they are not protected by the antimodification provision and their rights may be modified under a Chapter 13 Plan.9

1 Homeowners Funding Co. v. Skinner, 129 B.R. 60 (E.D.N.C. 1991).

[ Return to Text ]

2 In re Plaster, 101 B.R. 696 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989). Accord In re Stratton, 248 B.R. 177, 180–81 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2000) (Applying Montana law, mobile home that is not affixed to real property is personal property that is not protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2). “[T]he retail installment contract granted Greenpoint a security interest in the mobile home and other goods under the Uniform Commercial Code—Secured Transactions, not under mortgage law . . . . In Montana, ‘real property’ is defined as land, that which is affixed, incidental, appurtenant to land, or that which is immovable by law. . . . Donna owns no real property. . . . [T]he mobile home sits in a mobile home court, where it is not attached to real property. The yoke remains attached to it. . . . The clause ‘that is the debtor’s principal residence’ is nothing more or less than a clause modifying ‘real property.’ Without real property, the modifying clause is of no independent legal effect.”).

[ Return to Text ]

3 In re Owens, 36 B.R. 661 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).

[ Return to Text ]

4 In re Donahue, 221 B.R. 105, 108 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998) (“We find the manner in which the Debtor lives inconsequential. A home is a home, whether primitive or luxurious, and it is not our place to impose lifestyle standards on anyone.”), rev’d, 232 B.R. 610, 615 (D. Vt. 1999) (Denial of confirmation and relief from the stay were “predicated on a clearly erroneous factual finding” that the 10-acre lot and mobile home retained by the debtor was the debtor’s principal residence. “No evidence was introduced at the hearing regarding the primary residence issue. Rather, Judge Conrad relied upon arguments of counsel. . . . It is unclear to the Court whether Donahue’s mobile home constituted his primary residence. On remand, a full evidentiary hearing should be conducted to address this issue.”).

[ Return to Text ]

5 Green Tree Credit Corp. v. Thompson (In re Thompson), 217 B.R. 375 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1998).

[ Return to Text ]

6 In re Thurston, 73 B.R. 138 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).

[ Return to Text ]

7 In re Carter, 116 B.R. 156 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990).

[ Return to Text ]

8 269 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2001).

[ Return to Text ]

9 269 B.R. at 249.

[ Return to Text ]

The Paddock, LLC v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 917 F.3d 676, 680 (8th Cir. Feb. 28, 2019) (Benton, Beam, Erickson) (Bankruptcy court correctly determined that manufactured home did not become a fixture under state law and debt for purchase of home was not protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2). “The bankruptcy court heard competing testimony about the home’s attachment to the ground. . . . [T]he argument, the factual record supports the bankruptcy court’s finding that ‘the home is more like a structure on blocks than a structure deeply embedded into the ground.’”), aff'g 584 B.R. 15, 17 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. Apr. 19, 2018) (Saladino, Shodeen, Sanberg) (Bankruptcy court correctly determined that manufactured home remained personal property under Iowa law and lien on home could be modified under § 1322(b)(2). “In order for the anti-modification provision of [§ ]1322(b)(2) to apply, The Paddock’s claim ‘must both be secured only by an interest “in real property” and further, that the real property must be the “debtor’s principal residence”’ . . . .”), aff'g No. 16-01254, 2017 WL 1417221, at *4–*5 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Apr. 20, 2017) (Collins) (Applying Iowa law, manufactured home was personal property because it never became a fixture; plan can bifurcate debt without violating protection from modification in § 1322(b)(2). “[T]he home is more like a structure on blocks than a structure deeply embedded into the ground. The home does not have a basement or a foundation. The home sits on piers and blocks. . . . [T]he home could be removed from the property and would not lose substantial value if it was removed.”)).

21st Mortg. Corp. v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 900 F.3d 187, 190–93 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2018) (Elrod, Costa, Ho) (Applying § 506(a) and Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 138 L. Ed. 2d 148 (June 16, 1997), delivery and setup costs for a manufactured home are not included in “replacement cost” when Chapter 13 plan proposes to retain and use the home. “[T]here is nothing in § 506(a)(2) that prohibits considering the ‘proposed disposition or use’ of the property in the valuation. . . . [C]onsidering the property at issue under § 506(a)(2)’s specific replacement-value standard and in light of the property’s ‘proposed disposition or use,’ we hold that delivery and setup costs of a mobile home retained by a debtor must be excluded from the mobile home’s valuation under § 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. . . . § 506(a)(2)’s prohibition on deducting costs of sale or marketing does not compel including delivery and setup costs.”).

Reinhardt v. Vanderbilt Mortgage & Fin., Inc. (In re Reinhardt), 563 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 2009) (Clay, Gibbons, Greer) (BAPCPA changes to definition of principal residence in § 101(13A) did not alter § 1322(b)(2) limitation that protection from modification extends only to real property; mobile home is not real property under Ohio law, and lien on mobile home may be modified notwithstanding that creditor had separate lien on lot that was real property.).

Cluxton v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Cluxton), 327 B.R. 612 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. May 19, 2005) (Cooper, Gregg, Latta) (Lien on mobile home cannot be modified under § 1322(b)(2) because mobile home became real property under Ohio law when prior owner surrendered title and mobile home became taxed as part of real property.).

Wallingford v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-55, 2012 WL 3779954 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2012) (unpublished) (Black) (Applying Reinhardt v. Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance, Inc. (In re Reinhardt), 563 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 2009) (Clay, Gibbons, Greer), mobile home loan was not protected from modification because title to mobile home was never surrendered to clerk—a requirement under Ohio law to convert mobile home from personal to real property.), aff'd, No. 12-4174, 2013 WL 1777121 (6th Cir. Apr. 26, 2013) (unpublished) (Merritt, Suhrheinrich, Donald).).

Williamson v. Washington Mutual Home Loans, Inc., 400 B.R. 917 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 4, 2009) (Land) (Under Walker v. Washington (In re Washington), 837 F.2d 455 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam), and Georgia law, three-factor test determines whether object is personalty or realty: degree to which object has become integrated with land, intention of parties, and whether unity of title exists between personalty and realty.), aff'g 387 B.R. 914, 922 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. May 30, 2008) (Hershner) (Applying Georgia law, mobile home was intended by debtors to be part of realty, with their "improvements and upkeep of the mobile home demonstrat[ing] that they have always intended for it to be their permanent residence"; therefore, claim of creditor financing mobile home is protected by § 1322(b)(2) from modification, and mortgage survived confirmation of plan that did not provide for satisfaction and release of lien.).

In re Lloyd, No. 18-02936-jw, 2018 WL 6984813 (Bankr. D.S.C. Nov. 19, 2018) (Waites) (Under either South Carolina lien statute or common law, mobile home remained personal property, was not affixed to real property and was not subject to protection from modification for real property in § 1322(b)(2). Debtor could value and cram down lien secured by mobile home in Chapter 13 case.).

Riffe v.Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. (In re Riffe), No. 5:18-ap-05003, 2018 WL 3788973 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. Aug. 7, 2018) (Volk) (Under West Virginia law, perfection of lien on title to manufactured home through Department of Motor Vehicles is effective notwithstanding subsequent affixation of the home to real property. Chapter 13 debtor cannot treat manufactured home lienholder as unsecured when lien was noted on title before home became affixed to real property.).

In re Caudill, No. 18-70102, 2018 WL 3601834 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. July 25, 2018) (Wise) (Manufactured home is valued using NADA cost approach with adjustments for year, location and condition.).

In re Rucker, No. 17-04552-NPO, 2018 WL 3244458, at *3–*4 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. July 3, 2018) (Olack) (Applying NADA Manufactured Housing Appraisal Guide and rejecting comparable sales approach, manufactured home—personal property under Mississippi law—was worth $63,000, not $22,000 as valued by debtor’s appraiser. “Courts routinely have approved the use of the National Appraisal System (‘NAS’) with the National Automobile Dealers Association (‘NADA’) Manufactured Housing Appraisal Guide (the ‘NADA Guide’) for determining the replacement value of manufactured homes. . . . [T]he NAS’s NADA Guide is the favored valuation method both in the Southern District of Mississippi and in other jurisdictions.”).

In re Landrum, No. 17-52357-KMS, 2018 WL 6978762 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. June 11, 2018) (Samson) (Replacement value of manufactured home not attached to land begins with NAS/NADA adjusted to reflect condition. Recent sales of manufactured homes are not as good because replacement cost includes dealership and lot sales.).

In re Huff, No. 17-20290, 2018 WL 2325390 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. May 20, 2018) (Volk) (Conflicting appraisals of manufactured home are resolved by reducing creditor’s valuation substantially to reflect damage to home and unsuitable land that lacked a septic system.).

In re Fields, No. 16-12315, 2017 WL 3580169 (Bankr. D. Kan. Aug. 17, 2017) (Nugent) (For § 506(a)(2) purposes, 21-year-old mobile home is worth $10,500—the price a retail merchant would charge for property of the same age and condition valued without regard to location of the lot and based on value as delivered and set up.).

In re Garcia, No. 16-50210-RLJ-13, 2017 WL 2859756, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 30, 2017) (Jones) (After 2005 amendments to definition of “principal residence,” bank with security interest in land but with no interest in mobile home that sits on the land is not secured by debtor’s principal residence and is not protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2). “PrimeWest’s lien does not cover the manufactured home that is the ‘residential structure.’ The anti-modification provision of § 1322(b)(2) applies to real property that is the debtor’s principal residence. . . . [U]nder Texas law, a manufactured home is personal property. . . . Its lien covers only the realty; its secured claim is not secured by ‘a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.’ Thus both the anti-modification exception of § 1322(b)(2) and its exception, § 1322(c)(2), are inapplicable. . . . The Garcias are therefore free to propose a plan that modifies PrimeWest’s secured claim, in accordance with the general rule of § 1322(b)(2). Such modification may provide for bifurcation of the claim if the claim is undersecured[.]”).

In re Neace, No. 16-60861, 2017 WL 75747, at *1–*3 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 6, 2017) (Wise) (“Here, the purpose of the valuation is to determine the secured portion of Creditor’s lien to be paid over the life of Debtors’ plan while Debtors retain the manufactured home. . . . Under § 506(a)(2), ‘replacement value’ is the standard . . . . Creditor is not entitled to increase the replacement value of the manufactured home by $13,125, the estimated costs to set-up and deliver Debtors’ manufactured home to its current location, as those costs are not properly considered as a component of ‘replacement value’ under § 506(a).”).

In re Brown, 560 B.R. 188 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 14, 2016) (Warren) (Manufactured home was personal property valued for confirmation purposes at an amount closer to lender’s expert testimony because lender measured the size of the double lot more accurately and lender’s expert was more convincing. Value given by expert had to be reduced by higher repair estimate and by 5% to reflect rural location of doublewide.).

In re Tillman, 565 B.R. 586, 596-600 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2016) (Warren) (Manufactured home on a permanent foundation was affixed to real property and subject to lien of deed of trust; value of property was sufficient to fully secure both first and second liens. “The Fourth Circuit concluded that the real property requirement of § 1322(b)(2)’s anti-modification clause survives the definition of ‘debtor’s personal residence;’ therefore, the creditor’s claim could be bifurcated, because the debtors’ manufactured home constituted personal property under Virginia law. . . . This case presents the opposite situation of [Ennis v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC (In re Ennis), 558 F.3d 343, 345–46 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 2009) (Niemeyer, Michael, Bennett),] in that Hughes does not have an express security interest in the [manufactured home] but a lien only upon the real property Lot, which includes ‘any property affixed thereto.’ The court must determine whether the [manufactured home] is part of the real estate and encumbered by the Hughes Lien. If so, then § 1322(b)(2) prevents the Debtor from bifurcating the Hughes Claim . . . . [T]he [manufactured home] had a foundation that met building codes. . . . The court holds that the [manufactured home] is on a permanent foundation and meets the last remaining criterion of [North Carolina law] . . . ; therefore, the Hughes Lien encumbers both the [manufactured home] and the Lot, and the Hughes Claim cannot be bifurcated.”).

In re Govan, No. 16-00056-DD, 2016 WL 3027058 (Bankr. D.S.C. May 18, 2016) (Duncan) (Mobile home not attached to real property is personal property valued at replacement value under § 506(a)(2).).

In re Johnson, No. 15-80188-TRC, 2015 WL 5306549, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2015) (Cornish) (Mobile home was real not personal property when it had been "affixed to the real estate by being connected to bolts embedded in concrete embedded in the ground, the wheels and axles had been removed, permanent additions had been constructed and attached to the original mobile home, a deck was attached, the mobile home was connected to utilities, and [debtors] treated this as a permanent residential structure. . . . [Debtors also] had surrendered the original title to the county tax officials so that the property no longer is tagged as a motor vehicle.").

In re Smith, No. 14-06277, 2015 WL 4594096 (July 29, 2015) (Humrickhouse) (Bank's claim was not protected from modification under § 1322(b)(2) because manufactured home not affixed to permanent foundation was personal property under North Carolina law. Bank's secured claim was limited to value of real property on which manufactured home was placed when deed of trust omitted reference to manufactured home.).

In re Johnson, No. 1:14-bk-14558-SDR, 2015 WL 4053584, at *1-*3 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. July 1, 2015) (Rucker) (That one-third of manufactured home rested on neighbor's property did not forfeit protection from modification in § 1322(b)(2), but further hearing necessary to determine whether manufactured home was sufficiently affixed to ground to be real property. "About one-third of the home is situated on a neighbor's property and two-thirds of the home is located on the real property owned by the debtor in which Vanderbilt holds a security interest. . . . Section 101(13A) makes clear that the manufactured home of the debtor in this case is her principal residence, but it has no bearing on whether the home constitutes real property. . . . [A] security interest in the land beneath the manufactured home is not determinative of whether the anti-modification provision applies. . . . [T]wo-thirds of the mobile home does sit on land owned by the debtor and in which Vanderbilt does hold a security interest. . . . Because a significant portion of the manufactured home is located on real property owned by the debtor and securing Vanderbilt's claim, . . . Vanderbilt is not deprived of the protection of § 1322(b)(2) merely by virtue of the fact that about a third of the debtor's manufactured home is located on a neighbor's property. . . . [H]owever, . . . the parties have not stipulated to any facts regarding the extent to which the home is attached to land which would allow the court to decide the issue of whether the home is real or personal property.").

In re Fortenberry, No. 14-50768, 2014 WL 7407515 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Dec. 30, 2014) (Samson) (Manufactured home was personal property when no steps had been taken to classify it as real property under state law; debt secured by manufactured home was subject to cramdown under § 1325(a)(5)(B).).

In re Moffett-Roberts, No. 13-12442, 2014 WL 1674331 (Bankr. D. Kan. Apr. 28, 2014) (Nugent) (Manufactured home valued at replacement value under § 506(a)(2) using NADA appraisal guide with adjustments for age, condition and components.).

In re Tucker, No. 12-53285-JDW, 2013 WL 3230615 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. June 25, 2013) (Walker) (Plan not confirmable when value of mobile home exceeded proposal in plan.).

In re Everhart, No. 12-09569-A13, 2013 WL 176144 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2013) (unpublished) (Adler) (Mobile home valuation that included interior inspection was more persuasive.).

In re Woodward, No. 12-05722-dd, 2013 WL 149647 (Bankr. D.S.C. Jan. 14, 2013) (Duncan) (Expert's valuation of mobile home was more persuasive than debtor's opinion.).

Congrove v. Northern Hancock Bank & Trust Co. (In re Congrove), 485 B.R. 841 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2013) (Woods) (Mobile home loan was not secured by real property and was not protected from modification.).

In re Mixon, No. 11-41568, 2012 WL 3636911 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2012) (Davis) (Disputed valuation of mobile home and real property was based on best use; equity securing judgment lien prevented cramdown.).

In re Kollmorgen, No. 11-10904, 2012 WL 195200 (Bankr. D. Kan. Jan. 20, 2012) (unpublished) (Nugent) (Manufactured home value determined using N.A.D.A guide, which more closely approximated replacement value than did appraisal testimony offered by debtors.).

In re Nunnery, No. 11-80267, 2011 WL 4712083 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2011) (Aron) (Applying Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 115 L. Ed. 2d 66 (June 10, 1991), equitable owner could cram down claim secured by mobile home notwithstanding absence of privity of contract. Debtor had possessory interest and equitable ownership of manufactured home purchased by former husband and transferred to debtor in marital dissolution. Creditor was aware of debtor's equitable ownership claim, having accepted payments from debtor for seven years.).

In re Prince, No. 11-01041-DD, 2011 WL 2747797 (Bankr. D.S.C. July 12, 2011) (Duncan) (Debtor had no ownership or resulting trust interest in mobile home purchased by former father-in-law.).

In re Holland, No. 10-05404-8-SWH, 2011 WL 5902778 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. May 19, 2011) (Humrickhouse) (At refinancing of open-end credit loans into consolidation loan, credit union obtained re-pledge of security interest in mobile home, maintaining perfected security interest.).

In re Lee, No. 10-07833-JW, 2011 WL 9154707 (Bankr. D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2011) (Waites) (Merely residing in mobile home did not establish equitable interest sufficient to constitute property of estate. Debtor failed to establish good-faith, colorable claim to legal or equitable interest and may not treat Green Tree's claim in plan.).

In re Melara, 441 B.R. 749 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Feb. 4, 2011) (Aron) (Applying North Carolina law and Ennis v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC (In re Ennis), 558 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 2009) (Michael, Niemeyer, Bennett), debt secured by mobile home was not protected from modification because mobile home remained personal property—it still had wheels, axles and hitch, and certificate of title had not been canceled. Value of real estate under § 506(a) was determined, with mobile home having no value, without taking into account cost of removing mobile home.).

In re Starks, No. 10-22108, 2011 WL 248521 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 24, 2011) (Wise) (That mobile home was permanently affixed to real property is not enough to convert it to real property under Kentucky law; mobile home had active certificate of title that had not been surrendered in compliance with statutory procedure to convert personal property collateral to real property.).

In re Scott, No. 09-12198(1)(13), 2010 WL 4809340 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Nov. 19, 2010) (Lloyd) (Creditor did not have perfected lien on mobile home under Kentucky law and is bound by confirmation of plan that bifurcated claim. Security interest in mobile home had to be noted on certificate of title. For manufactured home to be considered permanently affixed to realty, owner must file affidavit of conversion to real estate in county where real estate is located, surrendering certificate of title. Statutory provisions were not met. Creditor was bound by confirmation after having adequate notice and not attempting to vacate confirmation for two years.).

In re Green, 436 B.R. 91 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2010) (Altenberger) (Under Illinois law, mobile home permanently attached to real estate was a fixture; mortgage which funded purchase of both mobile home and land on which it was located was not subject to modification under § 1322(b)(2).).

In re Meredith, No. 09-002872-8-JRL, 2009 WL 3188569 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 2, 2009) (unpublished) (Leonard) (Lien on mobile home and realty was fully secured based on lender's appraiser's testimony.).

Jordan v. Greentree Consumer Disc. Co. (In re Jordan), 403 B.R. 339 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2009) (Agresti) (Applying Scarborough v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 461 F.3d 406 (3d Cir. 2006), statement on proof of claim that Greentree had collateral "other" than real property, coupled with admission that mobile home was not attached to property at time of purchase, compels conclusion that mobile home was not real property for § 1322(b)(2) purposes.).

In re Maple, No. 07-10820, 2008 WL 3539793 (Bankr. D. Vt. Aug. 8, 2008) (unpublished) (Brown) (To value mobile home, witness is admitted as expert because of experience selling used mobile homes, but testimony has reduced weight because witness does not hold formal credentials or training as appraiser; mobile home is valued based on leasehold interest at mobile home park.).

In re Lara, No. 07-60188, 2008 WL 961892 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2008) (unpublished) (Steen) (Mobile home is personalty under Texas law and as expressed in contract, and § 1322(b)(2) does not prevent stripdown; land upon which mobile home is located is secured by mortgage that cannot be modified, but evidence of land value is inadequate to fix claim amount.).

In re Rivers-Jones, No. 07-02607-JW, 2007 WL 7714892 (Bankr. D.S.C. Sept. 4, 2007) (Waites) (Mobile home is not protected from valuation by § 1322(b)(2) because, under South Carolina law, mobile home was not real property. Section 101(13A) requires principal residence to be real property.).

In re Collins, No. 05-42982, 2007 WL 7022204 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Feb. 8, 2007) (Davis) (Mobile home lender failed to rebut debtors' testimony concerning extent to which mobile home had been attached to real property; debtors can modify lender's claim, which did not fall under protection of § 1322(b)(2).).

In re Collins, No. 05-42982, 2006 WL 6885806 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2006) (Davis) (Plan can modify lien on mobile home that was not secured by real property. Mobile home did not have permanent foundation, wheels and axles remained attached, and home may be easily removed without injury to real property.).

In re McNeill, No. 05-82077, 2006 WL 1314333 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. May 12, 2006) (unpublished) (Carruthers) (Deed of trust on real estate and mobile home is protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2) because wheels were removed and mobile home was placed on a concrete foundation, becoming an improvement or fixture that is included in deed of trust.).

In re Sizemore, Nos. 04-70705, 05-71168, 2006 WL 3877748 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Apr. 20, 2006) (unpublished) (Howard) (Under Ky. Rev. S. 186A.190, mobile home is not protected by § 1322(b)(2) when lien is not perfected by notation on certificate of title. Even though mortgage on underlying real estate was perfected, mobile home lien is separate, and plan proposed treatment as secured only to extent of land value. Court adopted In re Wilson, No. 02-34305 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. June 12, 2003), in concluding a mobile home to be personalty, not realty, and the debt was subject to modification.).

In re Tirey, 350 B.R. 62 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2006) (Letitia Clark) (Applying Texas law, manufactured home remained personal property, and debt secured by home and real estate on which it sat was not protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2).).

In re Valdez, 338 B.R. 97 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2006) (Carlson) (Applying California mobile home residency law, value of mobile home was fixed based upon value of home located in mobile home park even though seller did not have security interest in leasehold real estate.).

In re Sturgill, 337 B.R. 599 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Feb. 14, 2006) (Cooper) (Security interest in mobile home is protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2) even though different creditor has security interest in land; security interest in land is subject to modification because balloon payment on that note is currently due and under § 1322(c)(2), modification for payment over plan life is permissible.).

In re Coss, No. 02-65893, 2005 WL 5419055 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. July 14, 2005) (unpublished) (Gerling) (CitiMortgage is bound by confirmed plan that bifurcated claims based on plan's provision that creditor did not perfect its lien on manufactured home, which is not attached to real estate.).

Household Fin. Corp., II v. Ellis (In re Ellis), 324 B.R. 595 (Bankr. M.D. La. May 10, 2005) (Dodd) (Household does not have perfected security interest in mobile home since it failed to prove immobilization under Louisiana law; however, Household holds valid mortgage on real estate on which mobile home is located, that real estate constitutes debtors' principal residence and mortgage is not modifiable under § 1322(b)(2).).

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan (In re Jordan), 330 B.R. 857 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2005) (Laney) (Mobile home from which debtor had moved was not debtor's principal residence at time of filing; claim is not protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2), but plan is not proposed in good faith when only purpose of filing is to save mobile home that is no longer principal residence.).

Nowlin v. Tammac Fin. Corp. (In re Nowlin), 321 B.R. 678 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2005) (Twardowski) (Applying Pennsylvania law, mobile home on concrete blocks, with no wheels, that was surrounded by skirting and sat on leased land was personal property because it was not permanently attached to land and debtor never intended to keep mobile home in present location. Contract required lender's permission to permanently attach mobile home to land.).