§ 158.1     Alimony, Maintenance or Support
Cite as:    Keith M. Lundin, Lundin On Chapter 13, § 158.1, at ¶ ____, LundinOnChapter13.com (last visited __________).
[1]

Claims for alimony, maintenance or support described in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) are excepted from the full payment discharge by § 1328(a)(2).1 Although there are few reported Chapter 13 cases dealing with the dischargeability of alimony or support claims, the reported decisions apply the same § 523(a)(5) standards developed in Chapter 7 cases.2

[2]

Obligations to a spouse, former spouse or child actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record or as part of a property settlement agreement, are nondischargeable in a Chapter 13 case.3 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that professional fees and expenses payable to father and guardian ad litem for a Chapter 13 debtor’s child arising out of custody litigation are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5) in a Chapter 13 case.4 When the bankruptcy court found that a state court jury intended an award to the debtor’s ex-spouse to be alimony for her support and maintenance, that award was nondischargeable in a Chapter 13 case.5 A Chapter 13 debtor’s obligation to pay part of a pension to a former spouse for maintenance and support was nondischargeable.6

[3]

In some jurisdictions, it is common for Chapter 13 debtors to manage domestic relations claims through the Chapter 13 plan.7 When the debtor pays alimony or support through the plan, the underlying debt to the extent not retired during the plan is nondischargeable at the completion of payments to other creditors. Typically, the debtor cures default in payments of alimony or support through the plan and maintains regular payments required by the divorce decree during the life of the plan. At completion of the plan, the debtor should be current in the payment of alimony or support, and any balance or continuing obligation survives discharge.8

[4]

Not unlike a nondischargeable student loan,9 a prepetition judgment for alimony or support typically accrues interest under state law during the Chapter 13 case. Postpetition interest on a nondischargeable support judgment will be nondischargeable at the completion of payments under the plan but is not an allowable claim for distribution purposes during the plan.10 Perhaps the plan can separately classify the nondischargeable support claim for payment in full with postpetition interest.11 Plan provisions that purport to discharge postpetition interest on a debt for alimony or support have met with very little success in reported decisions.12

[5]

In a jurisdiction that considers changed circumstances relevant to the dischargeability of alimony, maintenance or support under § 523(a)(5),13 the Chapter 13 case itself may become evidence bearing on dischargeability. In a changed-circumstances jurisdiction, the debtor’s current ability to pay is considered to determine whether an obligation is “actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support” under § 523(a)(5)(B). The Chapter 13 budget and plan would be some indication of the extent to which the debtor is able to pay.

[6]

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 has directed much attention to the management of alimony, maintenance or support claims in Chapter 13 cases, but not because of changes in the dischargeability of such claims. Alimony, maintenance or support that is nondischargeable under § 1328(a)(2) at the completion of payments under a plan is the same in Chapter 13 cases filed before or after the 1994 Act.

[7]

But the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 made major changes in how alimony, maintenance or support must be dealt with through a Chapter 13 plan. As detailed elsewhere,14 the 1994 Act added a new seventh priority for alimony, maintenance or support in § 507(a)(7).15 In cases filed after October 22, 1994, the plan must provide for full payment of alimony, maintenance or support described in § 507(a)(7) to satisfy the mandatory confirmation requirement in § 1322(a)(2).16 If the debtor is financially unable to pay all unsecured claim holders in full, the debtor is forced by the 1994 amendments to separately classify priority alimony, maintenance or support for full payment through the plan; this separate classification will be measured against the unfair-discrimination test in § 1322(b)(1).17 That Chapter 13 debtors must provide for full payment of most claims for alimony, maintenance or support does not enlarge or limit the nondischargeable status of such debts under §§ 1328(a)(2), 1328(c)(2) and 523(a)(5). The 1994 amendments to § 507(a)(7) enhanced the collection rights of support creditors during Chapter 13 cases without changing the nondischargeability of such debts.

[8]

The claims for alimony, maintenance and support that are entitled to priority under § 507(a)(7) are not exactly coextensive with the claims that are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5). Debts for alimony, maintenance or support that have been assigned to a state or federal government or that have been assigned pursuant to the Social Security Act are nondischargeable at completion of payments under a Chapter 13 plan under §§ 523(a)(5) and 1328(a)(2) but are not priority debts under § 507(a)(7).18 That some assigned support claims are excluded from priority by § 507(a)(7) does not affect the nondischargeability of those same claims under § 523(a)(5). The addition of § 523(a)(18) to the Code in 199619 clarified the nondischargeability of assigned support at hardship discharge.20 In Cervantes v. Santa Cruz County (In re Cervantes),21 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 1996 amendments to § 656(b) of the Social Security Act enlarged the class of assigned support claims that are nondischargeable at the completion of payments in a Chapter 13 case.22

[9]

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 made another change with respect to the treatment of alimony, maintenance or support that could produce some confusion in Chapter 13 cases. The 1994 Act created a new kind of nondischargeable debt “not of the kind described in [§ 523(a)(5)] that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record.”23 This new exception to discharge applies in a Chapter 13 case only at hardship discharge under § 1328(b) and (c)(2) and then only in Chapter 13 cases filed after October 22, 1994.24 This new exception does not overlap the alimony, maintenance or support debts described in § 523(a)(5) that are nondischargeable in all Chapter 13 cases. A debt that is in the nature of a property settlement and not support that survived discharge in a prior Chapter 7 case under § 523(a)(15) is dischargeable without payment in a subsequent Chapter 13 case when the ex-spouse failed to timely file a proof of claim in the Chapter 13 case.25

[10]

After the 1994 amendments to § 507(a)(7), it is possible to have an alimony, maintenance or support claim that is priority, nondischargeable and secured by a lien.26 Discharge of the lien securing a support debt presents additional issues at confirmation27 and at the completion of payments.28


 

1  Claims for alimony, maintenance or support are discussed in § 73.1  Plan Must Provide Full Payment, § 73.2  What Claims Are Priority Claims?, § 73.7  Secured Priority Claims?, § 136.20  Alimony, Maintenance and Support in Cases Filed after October 22, 1994 and § 136.21  Domestic Support Obligations after BAPCPA.

 

2  See § 136.20  Alimony, Maintenance and Support in Cases Filed after October 22, 1994 and § 136.21  Domestic Support Obligations after BAPCPA. See, e.g., Lane v. Lane (In re Lane), 267 B.R. 679 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) ($52,308 awarded to former spouse as property settlement, though not denominated as alimony, maintenance or support, is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5) at the completion of payments in a Chapter 13 case.); Chance v. White (In re White), 265 B.R. 547 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001) (On ex-spouse’s complaint under § 523(a)(5) and (a)(15), debtor was estopped to dispute that state court award of 23.9% interest in Air Force retirement benefits was actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support because of agreement with ex-spouse that characterized the interest as support or alimony for tax purposes. Debtor also failed to prove that the benefit of discharge would outweigh the detriment to the ex-spouse for purposes of § 523(a)(15).); Kessel v. Kessel (In re Kessel), 261 B.R. 902 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001) (On the debtor’s complaint after completion of payments and discharge, amounts due former spouse under Texas divorce decree were actually in the nature of alimony or support and thus were nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5) and § 1328(a)(2).).

 

3  11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(5), 1328(a)(2), 1328(c)(2). See, e.g., Pacana v. Pacana-Siler (In re Pacana), 125 B.R. 19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991) (Child support obligations are not dischargeable in a Chapter 13 case.); In re Benner, 146 B.R. 265 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992) (Past-due maintenance payments are nondischargeable in a Chapter 13 case.); In re Raboin, 135 B.R. 682 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991) (“Child support obligations have always been nondischargeable under the Code.”); In re Warner, 115 B.R. 233 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989) (Child and spousal support arrearages are excepted from discharge in a Chapter 13 case.).

 

4  Beaupied v. Chang (In re Chang), 163 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We hold in the instant case that the identity of the payee is less important than the nature of the debt. Thus, although Chang does not owe money directly to [the child], because Chang’s debts to [the father] and [the guardian ad litem] are in the nature of support of [the child], they are nondischargeable.”).

 

5  Long v. West, 794 F.2d 928 (4th Cir. 1986).

 

6  Corrigan v. Corrigan, 93 B.R. 81 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).

 

7  See § 8.16  Domestic Relations Problems, § 58.5  Alimony and Support Exception, § 58.6  Domestic Support Obligation Exception after BAPCPA, § 88.4  Alimony, Maintenance and Support, § 88.5  Domestic Support Obligations Assigned or Payable to Government: § 1322(a)(4) after BAPCPA, § 106.3  Alimony, Maintenance and Support, § 124.6  Alimony and Support Collection after Confirmation§ 136.20  Alimony, Maintenance and Support in Cases Filed after October 22, 1994 and § 136.21  Domestic Support Obligations after BAPCPA.

 

8  But see Smith v. Martinez, 51 B.R. 944 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) (Debt to children arising out of divorce decree is dischargeable in Chapter 13 paying $1 notwithstanding debtor’s failure to timely list the debt. Claim holder is estopped from asserting due process objection to discharge under Reliable Electric Co. v. Olson Construction Co., 726 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1984), because subsequent to confirmation, claim holder “manifested an objective intent to be bound by the Chapter 13 plan by filing a proof of claim.”).

 

9  See § 158.2  Student Loans and § 159.6  Student Loans: § 523(a)(8).

 

10  See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2). See, e.g., Foster v. Bradbury (In re Foster), 319 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[P]ost-petition interest, as an integral part of the nondischargeable child support obligation, is also nondischargeable and may be collected personally against the debtor after the underlying debt is discharged.”); In re Messinger, 241 B.R. 697, 702 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999) (Postpetition interest accruing on state court support judgment is nondischargeable at the completion of payments under the plan notwithstanding that the plan pays the principal amount of the judgment in full. “[T]he Court concludes that interest accrues under state law on the entire amount of the judgment of the state court . . . . Because support obligations are non-dischargeable under §§ 523(a)(5) and 1328(a)(2), the interest accruing post-petition on those debts is also a ‘non-dischargeable’ obligation for which the Debtor will remain liable upon completion of his plan.”); In re Pitt, 240 B.R. 908, 910–11 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1999) (Postpetition interest on a priority, nondischargeable support debt is not discharged at the completion of payments under the plan notwithstanding that § 1322(a)(2) permits payment in full without interest during the plan. “[P]riority debts that can be discharged in Chapter 13 but not in Chapter 7 (i.e., debts for certain taxes) . . . must be paid in full through a Chapter 13 plan under § 1322(a)(2). Although such debts bear interest under non-bankruptcy law, § 1322(a)(2) does not require that such interest be paid through the plan . . . . [B]ecause § 1328 provides that priority tax debts are dischargeable—thus, although post-petition interest on priority tax debts does accrue, if it is not paid through the plan (as it need not be under § 1322(a)(2), § 502, and [Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 84 S. Ct. 906, 11 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1964)]), the bankruptcy debtor is discharged of liability or unpaid post-petition interest. . . . [P]riority debts that cannot be discharged in Chapter 13 (i.e., debts for support) . . . must be paid in full through a Chapter 13 plan under § 1322(a)(2). Just as with priority tax debts, support debts bear interest under non-bankruptcy law but § 1322(a)(2) does not require that such interest be paid through the plan and a claim for post-petition interest on unsecured debt is not allowable against a bankruptcy estate under § 502 and Bruning. Unlike priority tax debts, however, support debts are not dischargeable in Chapter 13—therefore, any part of the debt that is not paid during the term of the plan and remains outstanding post-discharge (e.g., post-petition interest) is not rendered unenforceable against the bankruptcy debtor by virtue of the Chapter 13 discharge.”); In re Slater, 188 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1995) (Interest on child support arrearages allowed in state court judgment and under Washington state law is nondischargeable notwithstanding that plan paid principal amount of arrearages in full. In a case filed before October 22, 1994, “even though the debtor’s plan does not provide for interest on the non-dischargeable child support debt, the plan is confirmable because the interest may continue to accrue against the debtor to be recovered from the debtor personally at the conclusion of the case.” Attorney’s fees awarded to former spouse’s attorney are in the nature of support and are also nondischargeable. Court cites Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 84 S. Ct. 906, 11 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1964), and Leeper v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 49 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 1995).); In re Crable, 174 B.R. 62 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1994) (Nondischargeable judgment for prepetition child support arrearages accumulates postpetition and postconfirmation interest at Kentucky statutory rate of 12%; plan provision for payment of support arrearages without interest does not defeat the former spouse’s right to postpetition and postconfirmation interest. Citing Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 84 S. Ct. 906, 11 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1964), and analogizing to student loans, child support arrearages are nondischargeable and accrue postpetition and postconfirmation interest, and the accumulating interest is nondischargeable upon completion of payments. However, during the Chapter 13 case, the arrearage claim holder cannot have an allowable claim for the postpetition (unmatured) interest.). But see Silverstein v. Glazer (In re Silverstein), 186 B.R. 85 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995) (Interest on state court judgment for child support arrearage pursuant to general state statute for interest on all judgments is not actually in the nature of support and therefore is dischargeable in § 523(a)(5) proceeding.).

 

11  See § 88.4  Alimony, Maintenance and Support and § 88.5  Domestic Support Obligations Assigned or Payable to Government: § 1322(a)(4) after BAPCPA.

 

12  See, e.g., Witaschek v. Sacramento County Bureau of Family Support (In re Witaschek), 276 B.R. 668, 680–83 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2002) (Completed plan that provided for child support arrearages with “no interest” did not discharge interest on support arrearages. Distinguishing Andersen v. UNIPAC-NEBHELP (In re Andersen), 179 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1999), “Witaschek’s Plan does not contain unambiguous specific language that tolls the accrual of postpetition interest on the child support arrearage or that provides for the discharge of otherwise nondischargeable debt . . . . The Discharge Order specifically excepted from discharge any debt Witaschek owed for child support. . . . The Court concludes as a matter of law that postpetition interest on a nondischargeable child support debt continues to accrue during the pendency of a chapter 13 proceeding and survives discharge as a personal liability of the debtor.”).

 

13  See, e.g., Sorah v. Sorah (In re Sorah), 163 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1998); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (In re Fitzgerald), 9 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1993); Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1110 n.11 (6th Cir. 1983).

 

14  See § 73.2  What Claims Are Priority Claims?, § 73.7  Secured Priority Claims?, § 136.1  Treatment of Priority Claims, § 136.18  Secured Priority Claims before BAPCPA§ 136.19  Secured Priority Claims after BAPCPA§ 136.20  Alimony, Maintenance and Support in Cases Filed after October 22, 1994 and § 136.21  Domestic Support Obligations after BAPCPA.

 

15  11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7), as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 304, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).

 

16  See §§ 98.1 [ Plan Must Provide Full Payment ] § 73.1  Plan Must Provide Full Payment and 291.1 [ Treatment of Priority Claims ] § 136.1  Treatment of Priority Claims.

 

17  See § 87.1  Power to Classify Unsecured Claims: Tests for Unfair Discrimination§ 88.4  Alimony, Maintenance and Support and § 88.5  Domestic Support Obligations Assigned or Payable to Government: § 1322(a)(4) after BAPCPA.

 

18  See § 136.20  Alimony, Maintenance and Support in Cases Filed after October 22, 1994 and § 136.21  Domestic Support Obligations after BAPCPA. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Santa Cruz County (In re Cervantes), 212 B.R. 643, 647–49 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997) (Child support accruing after judgment establishing paternity is nondischargeable in a Chapter 13 case under § 523(a)(5) and § 1328(a) because of assignment pursuant to § 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)); support obligation prior to judgment is dischargeable because only “accrued” rights are assignable under Social Security Act. Mother of debtor’s child applied for public assistance in March of 1993 and assigned accrued rights of support. Judgment establishing paternity and monthly support was entered in October 1994. Judgment ordered debtor to reimburse county for child support between March 1993 and September 1994. Debtor filed Chapter 13 in September 1996 and filed complaint to determine dischargeability of support obligation. Under § 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)), an applicant to the AFDC program must assign support rights “which have accrued at the time such assignment is executed.” “The pre-judgment arrearages are dischargeable because Monica Samudio did not possess any accrued support rights which she could assign at the time she applied for aid from the County. . . . In this case, neither an agreement to pay child support nor a decree establishing a support obligation was in effect at the time Ms. Samudio applied for aid. Therefore, she could not have assigned any accrued support rights to the County at that time. . . . Under § 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act, the assignment of support rights continues as long as the family receives assistance. . . . [O]nce a support order is in place, the recipient of aid continually assigns support rights to the County each time she receives a payment . . . . Therefore, in this case, once the paternity and support judgment was entered, the post-judgment support rights were continually assigned to the County and, as a result, the post-judgment arrears owing to the county are nondischargeable under the provisions of § 523(a)(5)(A).” Court rejects alternative argument that § 523(a)(18) makes prejudgment arrearages nondischargeable. When Congress added § 523(a)(18) in 1996, it did not amend § 1328(a) to include § 523(a)(18) as an exception to discharge at the completion of payments under a Chapter 13 plan.), aff’d, 229 B.R. 19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (Applying Visness v. Contra Costa County (In re Visness), 57 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1099, 116 S. Ct. 828, 133 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1996), support arrearage that accrued before state court order establishing support obligation is dischargeable in Chapter 13 case under § 523(a)(5)(A); arrearage that accrued after state court order is nondischargeable. Section 523(a)(18) is not an exception to discharge in a Chapter 13 case.), rev’d, 219 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2000) (1996 amendments to § 656(b) of the Social Security Act render assigned support obligation nondischargeable in Chapter 13 case.); In re Beverly, 196 B.R. 128, 131–33 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996) ($33,239.15 child support arrearage claim is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5) and § 1328(a) because it is either not assigned within the meaning of the exception to nondischargeability or the assignment is to a government agency and thus fits the exception to the exception in § 523(a)(5)(A). Debtor listed $33,239.15 in child support arrearages as a general unsecured claim assigned to the Division of Child Support Enforcement and thus excepted from priority under new § 507(a)(7). “Section 507(a)(7) is nearly identical to § 523(a)(5), except that § 523(a)(5) provides two exceptions to the exception as to the assignments, whereas § 507(a)(7) does not. . . . In other words, under § 523(a)(5)(A), if the debt for child support was assigned to a governmental unit it cannot be discharged in bankruptcy. . . . If, on the other hand, it was assigned to a non-governmental agency, it would be dischargeable. . . . [T]he omission of the exception to the exception from § 507(a)(7) is, in its effect, meaningless when it is read harmoniously with § 523(a)(5)(A) and the judicial interpretation of that section. Section 523(a)(5)(A) still mandates that claims for child support which were assigned to a government agency are nondischargeable. And as several courts . . . found prior to the addition of § 507(a)(7) to the Act, those claims are to be given preferential treatment in a Chapter 13 plan. If they are not, the automatic stay may be lifted as to the child support arrearages and the claimant may pursue other remedies. . . . Such a claim should not be classified with other general unsecured debts receiving only a percentage of the claim. As such, a debt for child support which has been assigned to a government agency should be treated as though it is a priority debt in a Chapter 13 plan: it should be paid in full.” After calling the 800 number listed in the phone book for “Child Support Enforcement,” court determined that the child support arrearage was not actually “assigned” as contemplated in § 507(a)(7) because the Division of Child Support Enforcement “does not make payments to the mother in lieu of Debtor’s payments. Rather, it is a government agency which attempts to assist in administering and enforcing the payment of child support. . . . The debt is still owed to the mother but the payments are made through the agency, so no assignment has occurred.” Even if the claim was actually assigned, Division of Child Support Enforcement was a government agency, and thus the claim would still be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5)(A), and “[a]s a result, the debt for child support arrearages . . . is nondischargeable and should be paid in full under the plan, or the automatic stay may be lifted.”); Ward v. Alaska Dep’t of Revenue (In re Ward), 188 B.R. 1002 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1995) (On the debtor’s complaint after discharge in Chapter 13 case, child support arrearages assigned to state are nondischargeable. Bankruptcy court declines on jurisdictional grounds to determine the precise amount of the debt because case is pending in state court to determine amount of the debt.).

 

19  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 374, 110 Stat. 2105 (Aug. 22, 1996).

 

20  See § 160.6  Exceptions to Hardship Discharge before BAPCPA and § 160.7  Exceptions to Hardship Discharge Added or Changed by BAPCPA.

 

21  219 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2000).

 

22  219 F.3d at 960–62 (The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (Aug. 22, 1996), also known as the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, amended 42 U.S.C. § 656(b) to state that “[a] debt . . . owed under State law to a State . . . or municipality, . . . that is in the nature of support, and that is enforceable under this part is not released by a discharge in bankruptcy under Title 11. . . . [T]he new section 656(b) does not refer to an assignment under section 602(a)(26). . . . [T]he discharge exception of section 656(b) applies to any discharge under Title 11—in other words, to any bankruptcy case. . . . [S]ection 656(b) provides an independent basis upon which to find a child support debt nondischargeable in any bankruptcy proceeding under Title 11. . . . Section 656(b) prohibits the discharge of a debt (1) owed under state law to a state or municipality, (2) that is ‘in the nature of support,’ and (3) that is enforceable under part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act.”).

 

23  11 U.S.C. § 523[(a)](15), as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 304, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994). The codification of this new section within § 523 and its effect at hardship discharge in a Chapter 13 case are discussed in § 160.6  Exceptions to Hardship Discharge before BAPCPA and § 160.7  Exceptions to Hardship Discharge Added or Changed by BAPCPA.

 

24  See § 160.6  Exceptions to Hardship Discharge before BAPCPA and § 160.7  Exceptions to Hardship Discharge Added or Changed by BAPCPA.

 

25  Cody v. Cody (In re Cody), 246 B.R. 597 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1999).

 

26  See § 73.7  Secured Priority Claims?, § 136.18  Secured Priority Claims before BAPCPA and § 136.19  Secured Priority Claims after BAPCPA.

 

27  See § 73.7  Secured Priority Claims? and discussion beginning at§ 74.1  General Rules before BAPCPA§ 136.19  Secured Priority Claims after BAPCPA and § 136.21  Domestic Support Obligations after BAPCPA.

 

28  See § 358.1 [ On Liens ] § 162.3  On Liens.