§ 137.2     Postpetition Claims after BAPCPA
Cite as:    Keith M. Lundin, Lundin On Chapter 13, § 137.2, at ¶ ____, LundinOnChapter13.com (last visited __________).
[1]

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA)1 did not amend § 1305 of the Code dealing with the filing and allowance of postpetition claims in Chapter 13 cases.2 But changes elsewhere by BAPCPA—especially with respect to taxes and domestic support obligations (DSOs)—may impact the treatment of postpetition claims in Chapter 13 cases.

[2]

BAPCPA has increased the confusion, if not the probability, that there will be litigation involving the status of postpetition taxes in Chapter 13 cases.3 The problem predates BAPCPA, but imprecise and inconsistent use of words in BAPCPA makes the problem worse.

[3]

Under § 1305(a)(1), “a claim against the debtor . . . for taxes that become payable to a governmental unit” while a Chapter 13 case is pending are postpetition claims.4 Discussed in depth elsewhere,5 postpetition claims are special in Chapter 13 cases and are treated differently in many respects. There is no deadline for the timely filing of a proof of claim by an entity that holds a postpetition claim.6 The claims allowance process for postpetition claims is controlled in part by § 502 and in part by special conditions in § 1305(b) and (c). The holder of a postpetition claim can’t be forced to file a proof of claim, can’t be forced to participate in the Chapter 13 plan7 and can escape discharge by refusing to cooperate.8

[4]

If there is question whether a claim is a pre- or postpetition claim, the debtor and the claim holder are likely to take opposing positions. If no timely proof of claim was filed, the claim holder typically wants to hold a postpetition claim. An unfiled postpetition claim will not be discharged9 and will emerge from the Chapter 13 case with all accrued interest and other contractual or statutory rights intact. If the claim is not a postpetition claim, the ordinary rules may apply: the claim can be time barred if not timely filed and the claim holder can be forced to participate in the plan or face discharge without payment.

[5]

There is the confusing possibility that a postpetition claim is simultaneously or alternatively an administrative expense. For example, when a tax claim is “incurred by the estate,” it may become an administrative expense described in § 503(b)(1)(B).10 But a tax claim against the debtor that “become[s] payable to a governmental unit while the case is pending” can be a postpetition claim in a Chapter 13 case under § 1305(a)(1).11 Depending on the kind of tax—for example, income taxes versus property taxes—when the case is filed with respect to the tax year or event and what entity is liable—the debtor, the estate or both—taxes too easily slide between and among “ordinary” prepetition priority claims, administrative expenses also entitled to priority, postpetition claims and, sometimes, just general unsecured debt.12

[6]

These characterizations matter a lot because allowance and discharge of tax claims are different depending on the name assigned. For example, under § 503(b)(1)(D), as amended by BAPCPA, a governmental unit owed a tax incurred by a Chapter 13 estate13 need not file a request for payment—timely or otherwise—to have an allowed administrative expense.14 If the tax is a postpetition claim under § 1305(a)(1), but not an administrative expense under § 503(b)(1)(B), then a proof of claim must be filed for allowance of the postpetition claim, but the holder of the postpetition claim can decline to file a proof of claim and escape discharge in the Chapter 13 case.15 If the tax is a prepetition priority claim,16 a timely proof of claim must be filed else the debt may be discharged without payment, but allowed prepetition priority tax claims can be paid in Chapter 13 cases without postpetition interest.17

[7]

New § 1308 further complicates this discussion. As enacted by BAPCPA, § 1308 requires every Chapter 13 debtor, not later than the day before the first scheduled meeting of creditors, to file all “required” tax returns with the appropriate taxing authorities for “all taxable periods ending during the 4-year period ending on the date of the filing of the petition.”18 There will be taxes for “taxable periods ending” before the petition for which a return is “required” for § 1308 purposes that were “incurred” prepetition but that do not “become payable” until after the petition for § 1305 purposes. This is true, according to some courts,19 when the Chapter 13 petition is filed in January, the debtor owes income taxes for the previous tax year but those taxes are not payable until April 15—a common fact pattern in Chapter 13 practice.

[8]

Under § 502(b)(9) as amended by BAPCPA, a governmental unit can file a timely claim for a tax with respect to a return required under § 1308 until 60 days after the required return is filed. There will be returns required for § 1308 purposes that involve taxes that “become payable” after the petition for § 1305(a) purposes. For tax returns “required” by § 1308 that relate to taxes that “become payable” after the petition, amended § 502(b)(9) is a definition of timely filing that did not exist before BAPCPA. A tax that becomes payable after the filing of a Chapter 13 petition may be a postpetition claim under § 1305(a), with respect to which there is no “timely” filing deadline,20 but if a tax return with respect to that tax was “required” before the petition for purposes of § 1308, the amendments to § 502(b)(9) fix a deadline for filing a proof of claim that is the later of 180 days after the petition or 60 days after the § 1308 required return is filed. BAPCPA does not tell us which timely filing rule prevails.

[9]

A couple of cases will illustrate the problems of characterization that were not resolved by BAPCPA with respect to taxes, postpetition claims and administrative expenses. In In re Whall,21 the Chapter 13 petition was filed on April 3, 2006. The debtor owed prepetition state income taxes for 2003, 2004 and 2005. The Massachusetts Department of Revenue (MDOR) filed a proof of claim for that prepetition tax liability.

[10]

A year after the petition—in April 2007—the debtor filed a Massachusetts personal income tax return for 2006 showing a balance due. Treating this as a postpetition claim, the MDOR declined to file a proof of claim and chose instead to ride out the Chapter 13 case and collect its taxes, interest and penalties some other time. The debtor filed a postconfirmation amendment proposing to pay the 2006 taxes as an administrative expense. MDOR objected, contending that the 2006 taxes were a postpetition claim under § 1305, not an administrative expense under § 503(b)(1)(B)(i), and thus MDOR could elect not to participate. MDOR made this choice because filing a postpetition claim under § 1305 “would require it to relinquish its claim for interest and penalties that would otherwise accrue under applicable state law.”22

[11]

The debtor argued that the 2006 taxes were “incurred” or “accrued” against the bankruptcy estate and were allowable as an administrative expense. Postpetition earnings continued to be property of the estate in the district,23 and the debtor reasoned that any income tax “incurred” with respect to the accrual of postpetition earnings should be paid as an administrative expense. If characterized as an administrative expense rather than a postpetition claim, the 2006 taxes could be paid in full through the proposed modified plan.

[12]

The bankruptcy court sided with MDOR. The court explained that § 503(b)(1)(B) defined as an administrative expense only taxes “incurred by the estate.”24 Section 346 of the Bankruptcy Code—as substantially amended by BAPCPA—contains this special treatment of state and local taxes:

(b) Whenever the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 provides that no separate taxable estate shall be created in a case concerning a debtor under this title, and the income, gain, loss, deductions, and credits of an estate shall be taxed to or claimed by the debtor, such income, gain, loss, deductions, and credits shall be taxed to or claimed by the debtor under a State or local law imposing a tax on or measured by income and may not be taxed to or claimed by the estate.25
[13]

Section 1398 of the Internal Revenue Code specifically recognizes a separate taxable estate in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases in which the debtor is an individual. Section 1399 then states, “Except in any case to which section 1398 applies, no separate taxable entity shall result from the commencement of the case under title 11 of the United States Code.”26 According to the Whall court, § 1399 of the Tax Code together with § 346 of the Bankruptcy Code mandated that “a Chapter 13 estate is not a ‘taxable entity’ under the Internal Revenue Code.”27 It followed inevitably from this analysis that “there is simply no separate taxable estate to incur taxes under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) in a Chapter 13 case.”28 Without an estate to incur the tax, the 2006 income taxes had to be the debtor’s liability individually and could not be an administrative expense. That the MDOR had not filed a proof of claim was not fatal to its postpetition claim, which would survive discharge together with interest and penalties that might accrue during bankruptcy. There are contrary cases.29

[14]

In Whall, the taxing authority wanted its claim to be characterized as a postpetition tax because it chose not to file a proof of claim. In In re Jenkins,30 the taxing authority wanted its claim to be characterized as a § 1305 postpetition claim because it filed an untimely proof of claim. The debtor in Jenkins filed Chapter 13 in March of 2007 owning real property that was in foreclosure. There were property taxes due for 2006, and the 180-day deadline for the timely filing of claims by governmental units was September 27, 2007. The Mercer County Treasurer filed a proof of claim for property taxes on January 29, 2009—long after the claims bar date. The debtor objected to paying the county’s claim on the ground that it was untimely and subject to discharge without payment.

[15]

The evidence indicated there were several components to the $8,039.46 proof of claim (untimely) filed by the county: $2,021.08 “constitutes real estate taxes that were outstanding as of December 31, 2006, the last billing period before the debtor filed her petition.”31 The remaining $6,018.38 was real estate taxes “which accrued postpetition.”32 The court concluded that the postpetition real estate taxes were allowed pursuant to § 1305(a)(1) because “neither the Bankruptcy Code or Rules provide a deadline for a party to file a proof of claim for the kind of obligation described in § 1305.”33 With respect to the $2,021.08, the County’s proof of claim was disallowed as untimely pursuant to § 502(b)(9).34

[16]

On the way to this holding, the Jenkins court observed, “An allowable claim under § 1305 is akin to an administrative claim under § 503.”35 In a footnote, the court engaged in this conversation with respect to characterizing a real estate tax as a postpetition claim under § 1305:

Although not presented as an issue, Ohio law would appear to hold that liability for a real estate tax debt is limited to in rem relief, with no in personam liability attaching to the obligation. . . . A question, thus, arises whether a real estate tax obligation would qualify as a “claim against the debtor” for purposes of § 1305(a). In the end, however, this issue is more of an academic exercise because accrued and owing postpetition real estate taxes will normally qualify as an administrative expense under § 503(b)(1)(B)(i), which specifies that it includes “property taxes for which liability is in rem, in personam, or both[.]”36
[17]

Whall and Jenkins demonstrate that the line between postpetition tax claims under § 1305 and administrative expenses is at best uncertain. Jenkins leaps altogether the question whether the 2006 real estate taxes “become payable” before or after the March 31, 2007, Chapter 13 petition.37 The footnote quoted above from Jenkins admits a possibility ruled out altogether in Whall: a postpetition tax that could qualify as an administrative expense “incurred by the estate” in a Chapter 13 case. There is no mention in Jenkins of §§ 1398 and 1399 of the Tax Code or of § 346 of the Bankruptcy Code, but perhaps there was no need—the taxes in Jenkins were property taxes, not income taxes.38

[18]

The new definition of DSO in § 101(14A) has implications for postpetition claims in Chapter 13 cases. Uniquely spanning the petition date, DSO is defined by BAPCPA as a debt for alimony, maintenance or support that “accrues before, on, or after the date of the order for relief . . . including interest that accrues on that debt as provided under applicable nonbankruptcy law notwithstanding any other provision of this title.”39 New § 101(14A) plainly contemplates that a DSO can “accrue” after the petition. Unsecured DSOs are assigned first priority under § 507(a)(1) and are entitled to payment in full as a condition of confirmation under § 1322(a)(2).40 DSOs are also nondischargeable in Chapter 13 cases.41

[19]

Under § 1305(a)(2), a consumer debt “that arises after the date of the order for relief . . . for property or services necessary for the debtor’s performance under the plan” is a postpetition claim.42 A postpetition consumer debt of the sort just described for which a proof of claim is voluntarily filed by the holder is allowed or disallowed under § 502 and shall be disallowed under § 1305(c) if the holder “knew or should have known that prior approval by the trustee of the debtor’s incurring the obligation was practicable and was not obtained.”43

[20]

It is not difficult to imagine a debt that “accrues” after the petition in a Chapter 13 case for alimony, maintenance or support within the definition of DSO in § 101(14A) that also is a consumer debt that “arises” after the petition for property or services necessary for the debtor’s performance under the plan as described in § 1305(a)(2). A pediatrician’s bill for medical services to a dependent of the debtor that the debtor is obligated to pay pursuant to a domestic relations court order might be a postpetition claim under § 1305(a)(2) and a DSO under § 101(14A).

[21]

If the pediatrician’s bill is characterized as a DSO, it will not be paid through the confirmed plan and will not be discharged unless either the pediatrician or the debtor44 files an allowable proof of claim. The timely filing of a claim by the doctor or the debtor becomes an issue.45 If neither the debtor nor the pediatrician files or amends a claim, the debt will not be paid through the plan and the debt together with postpetition interest (if any) will be a nondischargeable mess awaiting the debtor at the completion of payments under the plan.

[22]

If the debt to the pediatrician is a postpetition claim under § 1305(a)(2), the doctor cannot be compelled to file a proof of claim and that postpetition debt cannot be paid or discharged if the holder declines to participate in the plan. The debtor cannot file an allowable claim on behalf of the doctor if the debt is a postpetition claim under § 1305.46

[23]

Characterizing the pediatrician’s bill as a DSO could create timeliness issues for the filing of claims by the doctor or the debtor. Under pre-BAPCPA law, unsecured prepetition debts were subject to the timely filing requirement in § 502(b)(9).47 Timely filing for an unsecured prepetition claim under Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c) was within 90 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors. This presented no unusual hardship for pre-BAPCPA prepetition claim holders because prepetition meant prepetition—the debt could not accrue or arise after the petition and still be an ordinary prepetition debt. Before BAPCPA, debts that “accrued” after the petition were not subject to the ordinary deadlines for filing proofs of claim but were specially dealt with as either administrative expenses that must be timely (or tardily) requested under § 503(a)48 or postpetition claims in a Chapter 13 case under § 1305 that were subject to no obvious deadline for the filing of proofs of claim.49

[24]

But a DSO accruing after the petition is different under § 101(14A). A DSO that accrues after the petition in a Chapter 13 case is a prepetition claim; but it is not a prepetition claim. Neither the Code nor the Rules give any clue how, in what form or on what schedule the holder of a DSO that accrues after the petition will file a proof of claim or be provided for by a Chapter 13 plan. There is no suggestion in Bankruptcy Rule 3004 of how a debtor would file a claim on behalf of a DSO that accrues after the deadlines in Bankruptcy Rule 3002. A DSO accruing after confirmation could easily disrupt the feasibility of an otherwise healthy plan. There is nothing in § 502(b)(9) to suggest that a DSO accruing after the 90-day and 180-day deadlines in Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c) could be timely filed in a Chapter 13 case—except, perhaps, as an “amendment” to a timely filed DSO claim.50

[25]

DSOs accruing after the petition will not be uncommon in Chapter 13 cases. BAPCPA defined this new debt but gave no guidance with respect to its management. Because a DSO is a priority claim and nondischargeable in a Chapter 13 case without regard to when it accrues, Chapter 13 debtors have substantial incentive to construct plans or modify plans to pay a DSO in full or as nearly so as possible through the confirmed plan. Other unsecured creditors are likely to be forced to surrender dividends when a DSO entitled to priority and full payment accrues after the petition.

[26]

The holder of a DSO that accrues after the petition may prefer to be characterized as a postpetition claim holder under § 1305. At least then, the claim holder could choose not to participate in the Chapter 13 plan by withholding the filing of a proof of claim, and the debtor could not use the confirmed plan or modification of the plan to force the claim holder to accept payments under the plan.

[27]

The Chapter 13 trustee is interested in this debate at several levels. A DSO that accrues after the petition is still subject to the provisions of § 1302(b)(6) and (d) which require the Chapter 13 trustee to give several written notices to the holders of DSO claims and to State child support enforcement agencies.51 Of course, the trustee won’t know of the existence of a DSO that accrues after the petition unless the claim holder files a proof of claim or the debtor amends the schedules.

[28]

The trustee is often the party in interest in a Chapter 13 case who objects to the timeliness of proofs of claim. When a claim is filed by the holder of a DSO that accrued after the petition or by the debtor on behalf of that holder, the trustee must decide on a characterization for the claim, determine the deadline, if any, for the timely filing of a claim and then object or not accordingly. If the DSO that accrued after the petition must be paid in full as a priority claim through the confirmed plan, the trustee may have responsibility to determine whether the new claim renders the confirmed plan impossible of completion. If so, the trustee may have a responsibility to move for conversion or dismissal or some other remedy.

[29]

The drafters of BAPCPA did not think through the new DSO created by § 101(14A). The irony is that DSOs will almost always be important claims worthy of the most and fastest payment possible through a Chapter 13 plan. By creating a large new concept without careful context, Congress has invited complication and litigation that will delay the payment of DSOs and reduce the resources available for DSO claimants.

[30]

Imagine a Chapter 13 debtor who does not owe any DSO at the petition. Two years into the Chapter 13 case and many months after confirmation, the debtor gets divorced and several significant DSO debts “accrue” by virtue of a state domestic relations court decree.

[31]

What kind of claims are these debts? Arguably, under new § 101(14A), a debt in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support that accrues at any time during a Chapter 13 case is a DSO entitled to first priority under § 507(a)(1) and full payment through the Chapter 13 plan under § 1322(a)(1). But obviously, the debt in this hypothetical did not exist at the petition. It could not have been timely filed under § 502(b)(9) and Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c) because it didn’t exist. Or is this debt a postpetition debt under § 1305 that can be “managed” through the Chapter 13 plan only if the postpetition claim holder chooses to participate and the confirmed plan or modified plan provides for postpetition debts? There is, of course, little chance that the confirmed plan in this example would make adequate provision for payment of a DSO that did not exist at confirmation. BAPCPA serves up these questions without offering answers.


 

1  Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).

 

2  See § 302.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA.

 

3  See also §§ 292.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA, 302.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA and 513.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.3  Taxes after BAPCPA.

 

4  11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) (emphasis added), discussed in §§ 292.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA and 302.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA.

 

5  See §§ 204.1 [ Providing for Postpetition Claims ] § 113.6  Providing for Postpetition Claims, 281.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 132.9  Postpetition Claims, 292.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA and 302.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA.

 

6  See § 281.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 132.9  Postpetition Claims.

 

7  See § 302.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA.

 

8  See § 350.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 158.6  Postpetition Claims.

 

9  See §§ 349.1 [ Claims Not Provided for by the Plan or Disallowed under § 502 ] § 158.5  Claims Not Provided for by the Plan or Disallowed under § 502 and 350.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 158.6  Postpetition Claims.

 

10  See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B), discussed below in this section and in §§ 292.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA, 302.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA and 513.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.3  Taxes after BAPCPA.

 

11  See 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1), discussed in §§ 292.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA and 302.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA.

 

12  See §§ 292.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA and 513.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.3  Taxes after BAPCPA.

 

13  There is controversy whether a Chapter 13 estate can be a taxable entity. See § 292.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA.

 

14  See §§ 508.1 [ New Timing Issues ] § 133.5  Tax Claim Exception after BAPCPA and 513.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.3  Taxes after BAPCPA.

 

15  See §§ 302.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA and 350.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 158.6  Postpetition Claims.

 

16  See § 292.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA.

 

17  See §§ 98.1 [ Plan Must Provide Full Payment ] § 73.1  Plan Must Provide Full Payment, 100.2 [ Interest Not Required, with Exceptions ] § 73.5  Interest Not Required, with Exceptions and 441.1 [ New and Changed Treatment of Priority Claims ] § 73.6  Treatment of Priority Claims Changed by BAPCPA.

 

18  11 U.S.C. § 1308(a) (emphasis added), discussed in § 391.1 [ Tax Return Duties One Day before First Scheduled Meeting of Creditors ] § 42.6  Tax Return Duties One Day before First Scheduled Meeting of Creditors.

 

19  See § 292.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA.

 

20  See §§ 281.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 132.9  Postpetition Claims and 302.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA.

 

21  391 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. May 28, 2008) (Hillman).

 

22  391 B.R. at 2.

 

23  See §§ 46.1 [ Postpetition Earnings ] § 46.3  Postpetition Earnings, 207.1 [ Retention of Property of the Estate: Overcoming 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) ] § 113.11  Retention of Property of the Estate: Overcoming 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) and 230.1 [ 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b): Vesting Effect on Property of Estate ] § 120.3  11 U.S.C. § 1327(b): Vesting Effect on Property of Estate.

 

24  11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i).

 

25  11 U.S.C. § 346(b). Prior to amendment by BAPCPA, 11 U.S.C. § 346(d) provided more directly: “in a case under chapter 13 of this title, any income of the estate or the debtor may be taxed under a state or local law imposing a tax on or measured by income only to the debtor, and may not be taxed to the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 346(d), prior to amendment by BAPCPA.

 

26  26 U.S.C. § 1399, quoted in Whall, 391 B.R. at 4.

 

27  391 B.R. at 4.

 

28  391 B.R. at 4.

 

29  See § 292.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA. See, e.g., In re Hall, 393 B.R. 857 (D. Ariz. Aug. 6, 2008) (Bury); In re Dawes, 382 B.R. 509 (Bankr. D. Kan. Feb. 11, 2008) (Somers).

 

30  417 B.R. 462 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2009) (Speer).

 

31  417 B.R. at 466.

 

32  417 B.R. at 466.

 

33  417 B.R. at 470.

 

34  See §§ 276.1 [ Governmental Units ] § 132.3  Governmental Units, 281.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 132.9  Postpetition Claims and 508.1 [ New Timing Issues ] § 133.5  Tax Claim Exception after BAPCPA.

 

35  417 B.R. at 469.

 

36  417 B.R. at 470 n.5.

 

37  See §§ 292.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA and 302.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA. See, e.g., Joye v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Joye), 578 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2009) (Wallace, Thomas, Graber) (Following Dixon v. IRS (In re Dixon), 218 B.R. 150 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Mar. 6, 1998) (McFeeley, Pusateri, Clark), and rejecting United States v. Ripley (In re Ripley), 926 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 1991) (Brown, Smith, Wiener), state income taxes for 2000 are “payable” prepetition for purposes of § 1305(a)(1) in a Chapter 13 case filed on March 7, 2001.).

 

38  See § 292.1 [ Taxes ] § 136.2  Taxes before BAPCPA.

 

39  11 U.S.C. § 101(14A), discussed in §§ 440.1 [ New and Changed Priority Claims ] § 73.3  Priority Claims Added or Changed by BAPCPA and 519.1 [ Domestic Support Obligations ] § 136.21  Domestic Support Obligations after BAPCPA.

 

40  See § 440.1 [ New and Changed Priority Claims ] § 73.3  Priority Claims Added or Changed by BAPCPA. But see the possibility of less than full payment of a DSO assigned to a governmental unit described in § 507(a)(1)(B) as permitted by § 1322(a)(4), discussed in §§ 441.1 [ New and Changed Treatment of Priority Claims ] § 73.6  Treatment of Priority Claims Changed by BAPCPA and 519.1 [ Domestic Support Obligations ] § 136.21  Domestic Support Obligations after BAPCPA.

 

41  See § 552.1 [ Domestic Support Obligations: § 523(a)(5) ] § 159.5  Domestic Support Obligations: § 523(a)(5).

 

42  11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(2), discussed in § 302.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA.

 

43  11 U.S.C. § 1305(c), discussed in § 302.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA.

 

44  See §§ 285.1 [ Timing, Form, Superseding and Amended Claims ] § 134.1  Timing, Form, Superseding and Amended Claims before 2005 and 511.1 [ Filing of Claims by Debtor or Trustee: New Rule 3004 ] § 134.2  Filing of Claims by Debtor or Trustee after 2005 Amendments to Bankruptcy Rule 3004.

 

45  See § 285.1 [ Timing, Form, Superseding and Amended Claims ] § 134.1  Timing, Form, Superseding and Amended Claims before 2005.

 

46  See § 302.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 137.1  Postpetition Claims before BAPCPA.

 

47  See § 282.1 [ General Rules: No Enlargement or Exceptions, Except . . . ] § 133.1  General Rules: No Enlargement or Exceptions, Except . . ..

 

48  See § 279.1 [ Priority Claims, Including Requests for Payment of Administrative Expenses ] § 132.6  Priority Claims, Including Requests for Payment of Administrative Expenses.

 

49  See § 281.1 [ Postpetition Claims ] § 132.9  Postpetition Claims.

 

50  See § 284.1 [ Amended Claims ] § 133.4  Amended Claims.

 

51  See 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(6) and (d), discussed in §§ 417.1 [ New Noticing Responsibilities ] § 53.16  Noticing Responsibilities and 545.1 [ New Domestic Support Obligation Certification ] § 156.4  Domestic Support Obligation Certification.